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The entry of Regulation 1/20031 into force marks the start of an era of EU competition 
law also known as “modernization”. Partly influenced by the regime in the United States, 
the enforcement of rules protecting undistorted competition across the European Union 
changed dramatically. Among other changes, Regulation 1/2003 equipped the European 
Commission with a modified set of enforcement tools, including a power to adopt 
decisions making commitments offered by companies suspected of breaching Article 101 
or Article 102 of the TFEU legally binding. Commitment decisions are an alternative to 
prohibition decisions and should serve the Commission for a more rapid solution to 
competition issues identified by the Commission.2 Although commitment decisions were 
initially expected to be an instrument of antitrust enforcement which would be used only 
in exceptional cases3 they have been used heavily by the Commission over the past 13 
years since Regulation 1/2003 came into effect, becoming the number one enforcement 
tool in Commission´s disposal save from the cases of hardcore cartels.4 Albeit 
unanticipated at first, the success of commitment decisions is not surprising, considering 
the advantages it brings both to the Commission and to the companies.  
The objective of this thesis is to evaluate the practice of adopting commitment decisions 
based on two fundamental criteria – effectiveness and legal certainty.56 The effectiveness 
of the resolution of anticompetitive concerns lays in the heart of antitrust enforcement 
                                                 
1 Council Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L 1/1. 
2 Case C-441/07 P, Commission/Alrosa [2010] ECR I-5949, para. 35. 
3 See, to that end, TEMPLE JANG, J., ‘Commitment Decisions and Settlements with Antitrust Authorities 
and Private Parties under European Antitrust Law’ in: Barry Hawk (eds), International Antitrust Law and 
Policy: Fordham Corporate Law 2005, [2006], chap. 13, p. 270. 
4 For an overview of Commission’s decisions (excluding hard-core cartel cases) see Chart 1. on page 30 of 
this thesis.  
5 According to Italianer, “Effectiveness, proportionality and legal certainty are the guiding principles in all 
our remedies cases.“ see ITALIANER, A., speech at Charles River Associates Annual Conference in 
Brussels, 5. 12. 2012, “Legal certainty, proportionality, effectiveness: the Commission´s practice on 
remedies”, accessible at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2012_07_en.pdf. 
6 As the author will explain in more detail in chapter 4 of this thesis, the issue of proportionality of 
commitments will be addressed while assessing effectiveness, as the author deems the principle of 
proportionality a principle, which serves as a direct limit of Commission while assessing the effectiveness 
of commitments. The principle of legal certainty, on the other hand, does not serve as a direct corrective – 
the Commission should consider it while choosing which path it will follow in a particular case: a 
prohibition decision or a commitment decision. 
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after the entry into force of Regulation 1/2003.7 Built on this presumption, the first aim 
of this thesis is to define and explore features contributing to the effectiveness of 
commitment decisions and to analyse the limits of the effectiveness. This thesis argues 
that the effectiveness of commitment decision splits into its two interrelated principal 
components– the procedure leading to the adoption of the decision and the commitments. 
The envisaged purpose of the commitment procedure is to adopt a decision which makes 
the commitments binding while saving time and resources of the enforcer. It follows that 
in order to be effective, the commitment decisions should be adopted in due time, 
considerably faster than “standard” prohibition decisions. This thesis analyses the 
quickness of the adoption of commitment decisions while exploring features, which have 
a positive impact on the quickness of the procedure as well as identifying the deficiencies, 
which may slow the procedure down. The purpose of the commitments made binding by 
the decision is to address Commission´s competition concerns and make a positive impact 
on the market. The objective is to analyse features, which contribute to the effectiveness 
of commitments, mainly in comparison with remedies that can be imposed in a 
prohibition decision.  
The second aim is to discover how the use of commitment decisions should be limited by 
the principle of legal certainty. Based on these two criteria the author´s ambition is to 
answer the question what should be the appropriate extent of use of commitment decisions 
in EU competition law.  
To answer the research question, the author will analyse relevant decisional practice of 
the European Commission and the case law of the CJEU, the primary and secondary 
sources of EU law and soft law documents together with the available scholarly sources 
and monographies. For accessing the decisions of the Commission, the author will use 
the EUR-lex database8, for accessing case law of the CJEU the curia database9. Scholarly 
                                                 
7 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Report on the 
functioning of Regulation 1/2003, COM(2009) 206 final, paras. 13 and 18; see, to that end: GERARD, D., 
“Negotiated remedies in the modernization era: the limits of effectiveness“ in Ph. Lowe and M. Marquis 
(eds), European Competition Law Annual 2013: Effective and Legitimate Enforcement, Hart Publishing, 
Oxford/Portland. 
8 Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html. 
9 Available at: https://curia.europa.eu/. 
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sources will be obtained from various journals, mainly the Journal of European 
Competition Law & Practice, World Competition and the European Competition Law 
Review, Common Market Law Review and World Competition. For the research, the 
author will also use various electronic sources. 
This thesis is to be divided into five chapters as follows: the first chapter shall outline the 
aspects of the modernization of EU competition law brought by Regulation 1/2003 which 
bear a relevance to the analysis carried out in this thesis. The second chapter will be 
devoted to a brief retrospective view on the practice of accepting commitments under 
Regulation 17/62, followed by a definition of commitment decisions by description and 
analysis of the rules governing their adoption and relevant soft-law documents by the 
Commission. This chapter should serve as a stepping stone for subsequent parts of this 
thesis. The fourth chapter will outline how Regulation 1/2003 emphasises the 
effectiveness as the main ambition of EU antitrust enforcement. The fifth chapter will be 
devoted to the quickness of the commitment procedure, how it is achieved and how it 
could be further enhanced. The sixth chapter deals with the effectiveness of the 
commitments, which the Commission makes binding by its decision. This part aims to 
analyse features, which contribute to the effectiveness of the commitments and how this 
enforcement tool can, in practice, suit the Commission to address its competition 
concerns. The next chapter will explain the impact of commitment decisions on legal 
certainty of other market participants and how it should limit the effective use of 
commitment decisions. The final chapter will then conclude the main findings of this 
thesis. 
For the scholarly research, the author will use descriptive and deductive methods. The 
main method for the actual analysis will be the analytical method together with 
comparative and inductive methods.  
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1. RESHAPING THE ENFORCEMENT OF EU COMPETITION 
LAW 
Regulation 1/2003 is commonly known as the cornerstone of the process of 
modernization of EU competition law. The regulation, which came into force on the 1st of 
May 2004, replaced first implementing regulation in the field of EU competition law, 
Regulation 17/62,10 which had been in force since 1962.11 The proclaimed purpose of 
Regulation 1/2003 was to replace Regulation 17/62 with a legislation designed to meet 
the challenges of an integrated market and a future enlargement of the Community.12 The 
characteristic feature of the enforcement regime under Regulation 17/62 was a centralised 
notification and an ex-ante authorisation system for agreements under Article 101(3) 
TFEU.13 Regulation 1/2003 brought a radical change to the system of enforcement of 
competition rules.  
First and foremost, Regulation 1/2003 abolished the notification of agreements to the 
Commission seeking individual exemption and Commission´s exemption monopoly 
based on the application of Article 101(3) of the TFEU as this provision became directly 
applicable. Hence, it replaced the former centralised ex-ante enforcement with a 
decentralised14 ex-post enforcement, where not only the Commission but also NCAs and 
national courts directly enforce Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU.15 As a result, the 
                                                 
10 Council Regulation No 17 First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty [1962] OJ 
13/204. 
11 See Annex 1. for a brief historical overview of the origins of Regulation 1/2003. 
12 Regulation 1/2003, Recital (1). 
13 For the sake of simplicity and clarity, this thesis will be using the current numbering of Articles, as re-
numbered with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1. 12. 2009 – Article 101 for agreements, 
decisions by associations of undertakings or concerned practices and Article 102 for abuses of a dominant 
position. 
14 Some commentators note in this regard that „decentralization“ is not a correct term because Regulation 
1/2003 strengthened  Commission´s ability to designate and implement the EU competition rules in the 
European Union. See SCHWEITZER, H., PATEL, K. K., The Historical Foundations of EU Competition 
Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, page 216. 
15 Article 11(3) of Regulation 1/2003 obliges NCAs to inform the Commission before or shortly after 
commencing the first formal investigative measure when acting under Article 101 or 102 TFEU. At the 
same time, Article 3(2) of the regulation prohibits application of national competition law, which would 
lead to the prohibition of agreements or concerted practices affecting the trade between the Member States, 
which are not prohibited under Article 101 TFEU. National competition rules also cannot lead to the 
prohibition of agreements and concerted practices, which fulfil the conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU or 
which are covered by regulations for the application of Article 101(3) TFEU. This so-called convergence 
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modernised enforcement regime depends on market players´ self-assessment of their 
compliance with the EU competition rules and the ex-post enforcement of these rules by 
the Commission, NCAs and national courts. With the full applicability of EU competition 
law by the NCAs, it was vital to ensure consistent application of EU competition law 
throughout the Union. For this purpose, the European Competition Network was set up, 
mitigating the risk of different interpretations of similar principles.16  
Furthermore, Regulation 1/2003 explicitly regulates the burden of proof in antitrust 
proceedings17 and grants more powers to the Commission regarding the conduct of the 
investigation and sanctions. These include the power to interview representatives or 
members of staff of the inspected undertaking explanations and record the answers,18 
power to inspect private homes of company´s executives,19 the possibility to use seals20 
or power to impose more severe penalties for obstruction of investigations.21 
Regarding the decision-making of the Commission, Regulation 1/2003 specified 
Commission´s powers in “standard” proceedings leading to the adoption of a prohibition 
decision, based on Article 7 of this Regulation. Firstly, it explicitly empowers the 
                                                 
rule, extending the primacy rule, which was developed by CJEU in the case 14/68, Walt Wilhelm 
v Budeskartellamt, aims at creating a level playing field for agreements throughout the internal market. 
However, Art. 3(2) of Regulation 1/2003 allows for the Member States to apply stricter rules on their 
territory in regard to unilateral conduct engaged in by undertakings. As a result, member states may enforce 
national rules on “relative” market power below the threshold of dominance. See also SCHWEITZER, 
Heike, PATEL, Kiran Klaus, op. cit. 11. page 215. 
16 GERARD, D. M. B., “Public enforcement: the ECN – Network antitrust enforcement in the European 
Union” in LIANOS, I. and GÉRADIN, D. (eds), Handbook on European Competition Law – Enforcement 
and Procedure, Edward Elgar, 2013, p. 182. 
17 Article 2 of Regulation 1/2003 provides that in any national or Community proceedings under Articles 
101 and 102, it is the party or the authority alleging the infringement, who must prove the existence thereof.  
The article also provides that the undertaking claiming the benefit of the legal exemption under Article 
101(3) bears the burden of proving it fulfils the conditions of that paragraph. Therefore, the regulation did 
not shift the burden of proof regarding the application of Article 101(3) in comparison with Regulation No. 
17, which requested the undertaking requesting an exemption decision to prove the conditions were fulfilled 
as well.   
18 Regulation 1/2003, Art. 20(2)(e). 
19 Ibid., Art. 21. 
20 Ibid., Art. 20(2)(d); Commission has showed that it will not hesitate to impose severe penalties for 
breaking a seal, in judgement in Case C‑89/11 P E.ON Energie v Commission, [2010] 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:738, – decision imposing penalty of EUR 38 million was upheld by the CJEU, in case 
COMP/39.796 – Suez Environnement the Commission imposed a penalty of EUR8 million. 
21 Ibid., Art. 23., see case T-272/12 EPH v Commission where the General court confirmed the penalty of 
EUR 2.5 million for obstructing the investigation by not blocking an email address of one of the directors 
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Commission to impose any proportionate remedy of a behavioural or structural nature, 
which is necessary in order to effectively put an end to the infringement.22 The concept 
of remedies was unknown to the EU courts prior to entry into force of Regulation 1/2003, 
presumably for the reason that Regulation 17/62 did not use the word remedy, it merely 
stipulated that in case the Commission finds the existence of an infringement of Articles 
101 or 102 TFEU, it may require the undertakings concerned “to bring such infringement 
to an end”.23 However, the regulation empowers the Commission only to impose 
remedies, which are proportionate to the infringement committed and at the same time, 
necessary to bring an infringement effectively to an end. Accordingly, structural remedies 
can only be imposed in case there are no effective behavioural remedies or where equally 
effective behavioural remedy would be more burdensome for the undertaking concerned 
than a structural one.24 This restriction considerably limits Commission´s discretion and 
makes a significant difference between Commission´s powers to impose remedies under 
Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003 and to accept commitments from undertakings under 
Article 9 of this Regulation. The second clarification brought by Regulation 1/2003 is 
that the Commission may seek to issue an infringement decision about infringements, 
which have been committed in the past.25  
Under Regulation 17/62, the notification regime distorted the Commission´s enforcement 
priorities, forcing it to concentrate and spend its resources on dealing with notifications 
usually containing only minor infringements, instead of pursuing the most serious 
infringements of Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU.26 The fundamental change of the 
                                                 
22 Regulation 1/2003, Art. 7(1). 
23 LIANOS, I., “Competition law remedies in Europe”, in LIANOS, I. and GÉRADIN, D., Handbook on 
European Competition Law – Enforcement and Procedure Edward Elgar, 2013, p. 365. 
24 Regulation 1/2003, Article 7(1).  
25 Nonetheless, the Commission can issue such decision only in cases, where there is a legitimate interest 
in doing so. This provision was clarified in the judgement of the General Court in case T-486/11, Orange 
Polska S.A. v Commission, where the court held that this provision of Regulation 1/2003 is applicable in 
cases where the infringement has ceased and the time-limit on the Commission´s power to impose fine has 
expired. Examples of the legitimate interest may be cases where there is a danger that the undertaking might 
reiterate the conduct, or where the case raises new issues, which require clarification or where a decision is 
necessary to ensure consistency in the application of the competition policy. See also: GAUNER, C., 
DALHEIMER, D., KJOLBYE, L., DE SMIJTER E., Competition Policy Newsletter, Directorate-General 
Competition, unit A-2, 2003, No 1, Spring, p. 6. 
26 WILLS, W., ‘Settlements of EU Antitrust Investigations: Commitment Decisions under Article 9 of 
Regulation No. 1/2003’, World Competition 29(3), 2006, p. 345. 
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enforcement under Regulation 1/2003 enabled the Commission to set its priorities and 
spend more resources on investigating of cases and conducting inquiries into sectors with 
market distortions, but also to focus on emerging sectors with less ordinary forms of 
anticompetitive behaviour.27 These adjustments to the administrative procedure brought 
by Regulation 1/2003 along with a new type of decision available  to the Commission – 
a commitment decision – ultimately serve as tools for creating more space to prioritisation 
cases and lets the Commission concentrate and focus its actions and resources on 
combating the most serious competition infringements, secret cartels and the most 
flagrant breaches of Article 102 TFEU. 
                                                 
27  Commission Staff Working Documents ‘Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003’, 
SWD (2014) 230, para. 4; see also Annex 1.   
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2. COMMITMENT DECISIONS 
2.1 Commission´s practice of accepting commitments under Regulation 
17/62 
Regulation 1/2003 laid down the legal framework allowing the Commission to issue a 
new type of decision while handling competition cases – a commitment decision. 
However, it is important to point out that in practice the Commission had been accepting 
commitments from undertakings under investigation prior to Regulation 1/2003, which 
had formally introduced this new type of enforcement tool.  
Although Regulation 17/62 did not provide for a formal termination of antitrust 
proceedings by accepting commitments offered by undertakings under investigation, the 
Commission did in practice settle cases by way of accepting commitments without a 
formal decision. The Commission acknowledged this practice in XXIVth Report on 
Competition Policy, where the proclaimed Commission stipulated its readiness to accept 
undertakings28 from dominant companies to ensure efficiently functioning markets, 
provided that such undertakings are offered early in the proceedings.29 
Termination of the procedure by accepting commitments was important in cases where 
interim measures were granted, such as the Microsoft case, which ended with the 
company foreclosing licence agreements concerning MS-DOS and Windows.30 In the 
most famous case, which was informally settled, the IBM case,31 the Commission did not 
close the case but merely suspended the proceedings instead of continuing the 
proceedings leading to the adoption of the standard infringement decision, after the 
                                                 
28 The term undertaking in this sense has a meaning it has in British English – a formal promise or a pledge.   
29 Directorate-General for Competition, European Commission, Secretariat-General, XXIVth Report on 
Competition Policy, [1994], available at: <http://bookshop.europa.eu/is-
bin/INTERSHOP.enfinity/WFS/EU-Bookshop-Site/en_GB/-/EUR/ViewPublication-
Start?PublicationKey=CM9095283>, point 211.  
30 Ibid., point 212.  
31 Case 84/233/EEC IBM, also in Directorate-General for Competition, European Commission, Secretariat-
General, XVIth Report on Competition Policy, [1984], accessible at  
https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/3c93e6fa-934b-4fb9-b927-dc9fed71ccfe, 
points 94 – 95, The Commission monitored the compliance of IBM with the commitments until July 1995 
– see Directorate-General for Competition, European Commission, Secretariat-General, XXIVth Report on 
Competition Policy, [1994], p. 365. 
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company had offered to make changes to its marketing practices. By the time the IBM 
case was closed, it was the only case closed by such informal commitments where the 
Commission made the details publicly available.32 
Van Bael estimates that approximately ninety-six percent of all antitrust cases were settled 
in some manner, instead of issuing a formal decision.33 However, only a fraction of these 
settlements was similar to commitment decisions. Most of these cases included the so-
called “comfort letters” by which the Commission dealt with relatively simple cases 
involving applications for negative clearance or notifications for an exemption.34 
Regulation 17/62 was silent on the issue, meaning that the Commission had no explicit 
legal basis to accept commitments. However, there did not seem to be any legal obstacle 
for the Commission to informally settle cases in this manner, as the Commission had a 
broad discretion to choose, which suspected infringements of competition rules to 
pursue35, and thus informally extend it empowerments  
This practice, nevertheless, had several very important drawbacks. Firstly, the procedure 
leading to informal settlement of cases was not transparent, because the Commission 
published only very little information about this practice. Informally settled cases were 
usually only briefly described in the Commission´s Annual Report on Competition 
Policy. Another issue was the lack of clear criteria, based on which the Commission 
decided to close a case after accepting the commitments. Although the Annual Reports 
state that cases have been settled, because of alteration or termination of an agreement or 
a behaviour, Van Bael points out serious discrepancies in this regard.36 For example in 
the John Deere case,37 in which the Commission imposed a (by that time) heavy fine of 
2 million ECU on the company for export bans, despite the fact the company had removed 
these bans from its contract and made steps for compliance with competition rules soon 
                                                 
32 VAN BAEL, I., The Antitrust Settlement Practice of the EEC Commission, Common Law Market Review 
23, 1986, page 75.  
33 Ibid., p. 61. 
34 See, e.g. Case 2001/837/EC DSD. 
35 WILLS, W., op, cit. 26, p. 347. 
36 VAN BAEL, I., op. cit. 32, page 66.  
37 Case IV/30.809 John Deere, Commission Decision of 14 December 1984, O.J.  L 35/58. 
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after it had received the Commission´s statement of objections. However, there are at 
least 15 other cases involving export bans, which the Commission had chosen to settle.38   
Additionally, the Commission did not have the power to adequately oversee that the 
undertaking acts in accordance with the agreed commitments. As the IBM case 
demonstrate, the Commission could only monitor the obedience by itself, because there 
were no other effective measures, which it could undertake. Moreover, the Commission 
could only reopen the case and continue with a standard procedure towards issuing an 
infringement decision in case the undertaking had breached the commitments. Once 
again, as the IBM case shows, the companies made sure that the commitments did not 
provide for an admission of guilt and that they were not enforceable.39  
2.2 Commitment decisions under Regulation 1/2003  
In the White paper on modernization of the rules implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the 
EC Treaty, the Commission proposed adding a new type of a decision in Regulation 
1/2003 to address the above-mentioned drawbacks of accepting commitments informally 
under Regulation 17/62.40 Regulation 1/2003 did so by empowering the Commission to 
issue a decision based on its Article 9. This article provides the Commission with a 
fundamental legal basis to resolve cases by accepting commitments offered by parties to 
the proceedings.  
2.2.1 Article 9 – Legal framework for accepting commitments  
The Commission is empowered to adopt a commitment decision pursuant to Article 9 (1), 
which reads as follows:  
“Where the Commission intends to adopt a decision requiring that an infringement be 
brought to an end and the undertakings concerned offer commitments to meet the 
concerns expressed to them by the Commission in its preliminary assessment, the 
                                                 
38 XXIVth Report on Competition Policy, op. cit. 31, page 365. 
39 VAN BAEL, I., op. cit. 32, page 71. 
40 European Commission, White paper on modernization of the rules implementing articles 85 and 86 of 
the EC treaty, Commission programme no 99/027, [1999], para. 90. 
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Commission may by decision make those commitments binding on the undertakings. Such 
a decision may be adopted for a specified period and shall conclude that there are no 
longer grounds for action by the Commission.” 
Article 9 thus formally empowers the Commission to close the investigation by accepting 
commitments from the undertakings concerned instead of issuing a standard infringement 
decision based on Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003. From the wording of Article 9(1), the 
basic attributes of commitment decisions can be derived.  
The first sentence of Article 9 suggests that the Commission may choose to issue a 
commitment decision only in cases of infringements, which are serious enough that they 
would otherwise require adoption of a prohibition decision based on Article 7. This 
precondition also suggests the Commission should only accept commitments whilst being 
convinced that it would be able to prove the infringement to the extent required in the 
standard infringement procedure under Article 7. Conversely, Recital 13 of Regulation 
1/2003 provides that commitment decisions “are not appropriate in cases, where the 
Commission intends to impose a fine”. Typically, these cases include secret cartels, for 
which, on the other hand, a special settlement procedure is available.41 Additionally, the 
most flagrant breaches of both Articles 101 and 102 TFEU should also fall within this 
group, although there is little guidance as to the necessary severity of such 
infringements.42 The first sentence of Article 9 also provides that it is at the discretion of 
the Commission to accept commitments from the parties to the proceedings.43 Hence, the 
Commission may revert the proceedings with a view to adopting a prohibition decision 
and impose fines.44 To sum it up, the Commission may choose to accept commitments 
                                                 
41 Commitment decisions must be distinguished from the settlement procedure, based on Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 622/2008 of 30 June 2008 amending Regulation (EC) No 773/2004, as regards the 
conduct of settlement procedures in cartel cases. The settlement procedure is a simplified procedure 
applicable to cartel cases, the Commission continues the proceedings and establishes an infringement under 
Art. 7, but the parties to the proceedings acknowledge their participation in a cartel and their liability for it 
and receive reduction of a fine by 10%.  
42 See, to that conclusion, DUNNE, N., ‘Commitment Decisions in EU Competition Law’, Journal of 
Competition Law & Economics, Volume 10 (2) [2014], p. 403. 
43 See also European Commission, Commission Notice on best practices for the conduct of proceedings 
concerning Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, OJ C 308/06, [2011], (Notice on Best Practices), para. 115.  
44 European Competition Network, ECN Recommendation on commitment procedures, accessible at < 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/ecn_recommendation_commitments_09122013_en.pdf> [accessed on 
25.5.2017], para. 4.  
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and adopt a commitment decision in cases where the infringement is serious enough that 
it is necessary for the Commission to take action and to bring it to an end, but it should 
abstain from issuing such decisions in cases where it considers that imposing a fine is 
necessary, which is essentially in cases of secret cartels.45   
If the case is to be resolved by a commitment decision, an activity on part of the company 
under investigation is required, as will be explored in more detail in the following 
chapters. During the initial phases of the investigation undertakings usually communicate 
with the Commission and express their willingness to negotiate suitable commitments. 
After the phase of negotiation with the Commission about possible commitments, only 
the undertaking can voluntarily submit commitments.46 Commitments must address 
Commission´s competition concerns, which had been identified and subsequently 
expressed in a document called preliminary assessment. A statement of objections may 
be used as a preliminary assessment, as will be explained in the following chapter. If the 
Commission finds that submitted commitments sufficiently address its competition 
concerns, it has to submit the text of commitments to a market test.47 If the market test 
confirms the appropriateness of the commitments, the Commission may adopt a 
commitment decision which makes the commitments legally binding.   
The commitments made binding by the decision may be limited to a certain period of time 
as long as they provide that an improvement on the market is secured in a reasonable 
time.48 A review clause might be included in the decision49, or the Commission may also 
review the decision on its own or on a notice from the undertaking and conclude the 
commitments are no longer necessary.50 As is the case with remedies imposed under 
Article 7, the commitments offered by the undertakings concerned can be either 
                                                 
45 Ibid., para. 116. 
46 Antitrust Manual of Procedures for the Application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU [2012] (Manual of 
Procedures), chapter 16, para. 8. 
47 Regulation 1/2003, Article 29(4). 
48 Manual of procedures, op. cit. 45, para. 51. 
49 Ibid., para. 52. 
50 See, e.g. Case AT.39678/AT.39731–Deutsche Bahn I / II, Commission decision about early termination 
of commitments of 8 May 2011. 
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behavioural or structural.51 The possibility to review the commitments will apparently 
apply only to behavioural commitments.     
Most importantly, commitment decisions only conclude “there are no grounds for action 
by the Commission without concluding whether there has been or still is an 
infringement”.52 The Commission thus does not authoritatively state whether the 
investigated behaviour was unlawful, it only states that there is no need to take action 
anymore Accordingly, commitment decisions do not include a fine. The absence of 
establishing an infringement makes commitment decisions particularly appealing for the 
undertakings concerned, as they avoid negative outcomes of standard infringement 
decisions, including negative publicity, court proceedings, which typically follow after 
prohibition decisions, possibly hefty fine and follow-up actions for damages.  
2.2.2 Failure to comply with commitment decision and reopening of the case 
Formalisation of the practice of accepting commitments strengthens the position of the 
Commission by giving it the power to enforce the commitments offered by the 
undertakings. If a breach of informal commitments occurred under Regulation 17/62, the 
Commission could only reopen the proceedings and continue with a standard procedure 
leading to prohibition decision. By contrast, under the formalised procedure of accepting 
commitments under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003, the breach of commitments became 
a legal offence.53  As a result, the Commission is not obliged to establish that the original 
conduct of the company, which was addressed by the commitments, infringed Article 101 
or 102 TFEU,54 it merely must prove an infringement of the commitments, which the 
Commission´s decision made binding.55 In the event of breach of the commitments, 
Regulation 1/2003 provides that the Commission may impose either a lump sum penalty 
                                                 
51 ECN Recommendation on Commitment Procedures, op. cit. 44, para. 16; Manual of Procedures, op. cit. 
45, chapter 16, para. 48.  
52 Regulation 1/2003, Recital 13. 
53 To the same conclusion, see e.g. COOK, CH. J., ‘Commitment Decisions: The Law and Practice under 
Article 9’, World Competition 29(2), 2006, p. 221. 
54 As confirmed by judgment of the General Court in Case T-342/11 CEEES and Asociación de Gestores 
de Estaciones de Servicio v Commission, para. 56. 
55 See Case AT.39530 Microsoft, Commission decision of 6. March 2013 where fine of EUR 504 million 
was imposed on the company for breaching the commitments.  
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of up to 10% of the company´s turnover in the preceding business year 56 or a periodic 
penalty payments not exceeding 5% of the company´s average daily turnover in the 
preceding business year per day.57 The penalties imposed by the Commission for non-
compliance with the commitments can thus reach the same amounts as sanctions for 
infringements of Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU.58  
In addition to the possibility of imposing fines, Art. 9(2) of Regulation 1/2003 enables 
the Commission to reopen the proceedings, either following a complaint or on its own 
initiative, in case one of following three scenarios:  
 (i) the facts on which the decision was based have changed materially,  
 (ii) the undertaking concerned acts contrary to the commitments, or  
(iii) the information provided by the parties on which the decision was based was 
incorrect or misleading.  
However, the outcome of reopened proceedings does not necessarily entail a prohibition 
decision together with a fine. In fact, no decision has been opened on the basis of Article 
9(2) which would result in the Commission adopting a prohibition decision so far. On the 
other hand, the Commission reopened proceedings based on a material change of facts 
and adopted a decision, in which it declared the commitments no longer necessary.59 That 
shows the Commission is willing to review and prematurely terminate the commitments 
based on a notice by the undertaking concerned.  
                                                 
56 Regulation 1/2003, Art. 23(2)(c). 
57 Regulation 1/2003, Art. 24(1)(c). 
58 According to Art. 23(2)(a) of Regulation 1/2003 the Commission may impose a lump sum penalty of up 
to 10% of company’s annual turnover for the preceding year for infringement of Art. 101 or 102 TFEU. 
Pursuant to Art. 24(1)(a) of Regulation 1/2003 the Commission may impose periodic penalty payments of 
up to 5% of the average daily turnover in the preceding business year per day in order to compel the 
company to put an end to an infringement of Art. 101 or 102 TFEU, imposed in a prohibition decision 
based on Art. 7 of the regulation.  
59 Case AT.39317, E.ON Gas, Commission decision of 26 July 2016, where the Commission adopted a 
decision in which it concluded the market conditions had changed to the extent that justifies termination of 
the commitments.  
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3. IN PURSUIT OF EFFECTIVENESS 
According to Gerrard, the modernization of EU competition law encompasses three 
interrelated dimensions: substantive, institutional and procedural.60 Substantive 
modernization entails the transformation from a form-based approach towards a more 
effects-based approach. The effects-based approach means that the assessment of a 
particular conduct is not based on its form, but on its anticompetitive effect. The 
Commission thus needs to establish a theory of harm and assess the degree to which the 
negative effect might be outweighed by efficiency gains.61 That entails a shift in regards 
how economic principles and economic evidence are used while assessing competition 
cases, particularly while establishing a theory of harm.62 Accordingly, the effects-based 
approach demands a comprehensive understanding of the functioning of each particular 
market. Institutional modernization is represented by the abovementioned 
decentralisation of the EU competition law enforcement between the Commission and 
the NCAs and the associated establishment of the European Competition Network. The 
last dimension of the modernization is procedural, portrayed by the departure from the 
adjudicative EU competition law towards negotiated procedures – commitments, 
settlements and leniency. This rise of negotiated procedures corresponds to the boosted 
amounts of fines imposed by the Commission, resulting in companies opting for 
negotiation with the Commission, seeking a reduction or even total avoidance of possibly 
hefty fines.  
From the standpoint of the Commission, the modernization process emphasises that 
effectiveness of the resolution of the particular antitrust problem is the main objective of 
the competition law enforcement.63 The pursuit of effectiveness is projected in all three 
dimensions of the modernization process as explained above. With regard to substantive 
modernization, the enforcement focuses on the effects of the conduct rather than on its 
                                                 
60 GERRARD, D., op. cit 7, p. 2. 
61 Report by the EAGCP ‘An economic approach to Article 82’, [2006], accessible at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/eagcp_july_21_05.pdf. 
62 ROELLER, L. H., STEHMANN, O., ‘The Year 2005 at DG Competition: The Trend towards a More 
Effects-Based Approach’, Review of Industrial Organization (2006) Volume 29 (4), p. 286. 
63 GERRARD, D., op. cit. 7 above, p. 3.  
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form, by institutional modernization the NCAs were entrusted with the application of the 
EU competition rules in order to apply the rules effectively across the union, as the law 
can be implemented by the enforcer, who is able to do so most effectively.64 The focus 
on effectiveness in terms of procedural modernization is self-evident. In its recitals, 
Regulation 1/2003 stresses out the importance of effectiveness in relation to almost every 
aspect of the enforcement.65 Moreover, the effective application of the competition rules 
laid down under the TFEU as the main objective of Regulation 1/2003 is explicitly stated 
in recital 35.66 The principle of effectiveness is thus inseparable from commitment 
decisions which was clearly confirmed by the CJEU in the Alrosa judgement, where the 
court stated that commitment decisions are “intended to ensure that the competition rules 
laid down in the EC Treaty are applied effectively”.67 
The question this thesis aims to address is, which aspects contribute to the effectivity of 
commitment decisions, mainly in comparison to the prohibition decision based on Article 
7 of Regulation 1/2003 as an alternative thereof.68 The following two chapters aim to 
discover and analyse different features contributing to the effectiveness of the resolution 
of a particular case by a way of a commitment decision. For the purpose of this analysis, 
the author focuses on two integral parts of commitment decisions: the commitment 
procedure and the commitments, which are rendered binding by the decision.    
                                                 
64 White paper on modernization, op. cit. 40, para. 47; Report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003, op. 
cit. 7, para. 18; Regulation 1/2003, Recitals 6 and 8. 
65 See Regulation 1/2003, Recital (1) in relation to effective application of Articles 101 and 102 in general, 
(2) relates to effective supervision on agreements restricting the competition under Article 101(3) TFEU, 
(5) regarding the regulation of the burden of proof, (12) relates to effectivity connected to remedies imposed 
under Article 7 of the regulation, (25) in relation to investigative powers of the Commission and (26) 
regarding Commission´s inspections. 
66 The second sentence of the Recital (34) states that „this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary 
in order to achieve its objective, which is to allow the Community competition rules to be applied 
effectively“. 
67 Judgement of the CJEU in Case C‑441/07 P Commission v Alrosa, para 35. 
68 Joaquín Almunia in his speech noted “When the EU competition authority decides to pursue an antitrust 
case, it can follow one of two main paths: a prohibition decision under article 7 of Regulation 1/2003 or a 
commitment decision under article 9. This is well known“, see ALMUNIA, Joaquín, „Remedies, 
commitments and settlements in antitrust“, speech at SV Kartellrecht Brussels, 8 March 2013, accessible 
at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-210_en.htm.  
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4. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE COMMITMENT PROCEDURE  
4.1 Introduction: Rapid solution of Commission´s antitrust concerns  
One of the main advantages of commitment decisions is quick resolution of 
Commission´s competition concerns. The quickness of the commitment procedure is 
generally appraised as one of the main advantages of commitment decisions. 
Accordingly, quickness of the adoption of the decision, which makes commitments 
offered by the undertaking concerned binding, brings a swifter change on the market to 
the benefit of consumers, while, at the same time, saving Commission´s resources.6970 
According to the CJEU, commitment decisions should provide a more rapid solution to 
the competition problem identified by the Commission in comparison with proceedings 
leading to a prohibition decision.71 The author of this thesis recognises quickness as one 
of the aspects contributing to the effectiveness of commitments decisions. The idea is 
based on a presumption that only a decision which is adopted within a reasonable time 
may be considered effective as only a decision which is adopted in due time brings the 
desired change to the market affected by the anticompetitive conduct.72 Conversely, 
decisions accepted after lengthy discussions on commitments between the Commission 
and companies may no longer reflect the reality of the market. There are several aspects 
which contribute to the quickness of commitment decisions, which will be explored and 
analysed on the following pages.  
4.2 The commitment procedure and its stages 
The quickness of the commitment procedure is achieved through a relatively streamlined 
process with less procedural steps, which should enable the Commission to adopt the final 
decision sooner than in more formalised procedure leading to an infringement decision. 
Unlike infringement decisions, commitment decisions are not based on a full 
                                                 
69 ITALIANER, A., The ECN, convergence and enforcement of EU competition law: achievements and 
challenges, speech on European Competition Day, Vilnius, 3 October 2013, accessible at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2013_08_en.pdf. 
70 Notice on Best Practices, op. cit. 43. para. 103. 
71 Judgement of the CJEU in case C-441/07 P, Commission v Alrosa [2010] ECR I-5949, para. 35. 
72 See also, to that conclusion, MARSDEN, P., ‘Toward an Approach to Commitments that is “Just Right’, 
Competition Law International, Volume 11, [2015], p. 71. 
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investigation and the Commission is not obliged to precisely conclude on the facts of the 
case or on the application of the law.73  
The procedural rules on accepting commitments are only partially developed in 
Regulation 1/2003. Additional guidance is thus given by Commission´s soft law 
documents and decisional practice. According to Commission´s Best Practices 
undertakings are encouraged to express their willingness to discuss commitments at the 
earliest stage possible, but may contact the Commission at any point in time to see, 
whether the Commission is open to close the case by means of adopting a commitment 
decision.74 The parties will be offered a State of Play meeting, during which the DG 
Competition will present the initial assessment of its competition concerns, the underlying 
factual evidence and theory of harm.75 The Commission will also indicate a timeframe, 
within which the discussions on commitments should be concluded.76  
i. Initiation of the commitment procedure 
Recital 13 of Regulation 1/2003 states that commitments may be accepted during 
proceedings. A formal initiation of proceedings by the Commission is thus required. As 
in the infringement proceedings under Article 7, the investigation into suspected breach 
of antitrust rules may be opened following a complaint or an ex offo investigation. If the 
Commission intends to adopt a decision under Articles 7-10 of Regulation 1/2003 it may 
decide to open proceedings at any point in time,77 when the Commission concludes the 
case merits further investigation, provided the scope thereof has been defined 
sufficiently.78 The Commission usually publicly informs about opening the proceedings 
via a press release on Commission´s web page.79 In cartel cases, the Commission 
regularly opens the proceedings by issuing a statement of objections, while in the rest of 
                                                 
73 Antitrust Manual of Procedures, op. cit. 46, chapter 16, para. 7.  
74 Notice on Best Practices, op. cit. 43, para. 104. 
75 Manual of Procedures, op. cit. 46, chapter 16, para. 20. 
76 Notice on Best Practices, op. cit. 43, para. 105. 
77 Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the 
Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, Article 2(1). 
78 Notice on Best Practices, op. cit. 43, para. 17. 
79 Regulation No. 773/2004, op. cit. 78, Article 2.  
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the cases there is a considerable time lag between the opening of the proceedings and the 
adoption of a statement of objections or a preliminary assessment.   
ii. Preliminary assessment and statement of objections 
Article 9(1) of Regulation 1/2003 stipulates that commitments may be offered after 
Commission expresses its competition concerns in its preliminary assessment. The 
preliminary assessment should summarise the facts of the case and expresses 
Commission´s competition concerns that would warrant adopting a prohibition 
decision.80 Although the preliminary assessment should include the main facts of the case 
and identify Commission´s competition concerns, it does not need to have the same 
standard of reasoning and evidence as a statement of objections. In cases where the party 
to the proceedings declined the State of Play meeting, the preliminary assessment should 
serve as a basis for formulating adequate commitments to address competition concerns 
of the Commission.81 According to the Commission, the length of the preliminary 
assessment varies from 10 to 70 pages, depending on the complexity of the case or the 
“Commission´s interest to set a precedent case in the later commitment decision”.82  
Statement of objections has in some cases substituted for a preliminary assessment, which 
demonstrates that the Commission is free to accept commitments even in cases, where it 
supposedly intended to issue an infringement decision.83 Statement of objections must be 
adopted in cases where the Commission intends to adopt a prohibition decision. Its 
purpose is to inform the parties to the proceedings of the objections which the 
Commission raises against them, in order to allow them to exercise their rights of 
defence.84 Similarly to statements of objections, preliminary assessments are not 
published nor made available to third parties and are only sent to the company under 
investigation. The final commitment decision contains a mere summary of the 
preliminary assessment or the statement of objections, in cases where this document was 
adopted. Normally the undertakings will have a period of one month to formally submit 
                                                 
80 Antitrust Manual of Procedures, op. cit. 46, chapter 16, para. 24. 
81 Notice on Best Practices, op. cit. 43, para. 108. 
82 Antitrust Manual of Procedures, op. cit. 46, chapter 16, para. 26. 
83 Notice on Best Practices provide for this eventuality in para. 109.  
84 Antitrust Manual of Procedures, op. cit. 46, chapter 11, para. 2. 
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their commitments.85 In case the negotiation on commitments fails for some reason, the 
Commission will continue the proceedings pursuant to Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003.86  
iii. Market Testing 
If the Commission is convinced that the proposed commitments are adequate to address 
its competition concerns it must publish a “Market Test Notice” (or “Notice for public 
comment”), which is a “concise summary of the case and the main content of the 
commitments or of the proposed course of action”.87 The publication of the Market Test 
Notice triggers a phase of so-called market testing, in which interested third parties are 
invited to submit their observations, normally within no less than one month from the 
publication of the notice. The summary is also published in the Official Journal, in all EU 
official languages, together with a document containing offered commitments by the 
company under investigation in its authentic language. To promote transparency of the 
process, the Commission also issues a press release, asking interested third parties to 
submit their comments on the proposed commitments.88 In addition, the Commission may 
also proactively contact third parties seeking their feedback on proposed commitments.  
The description of the summary of the case, Commission´s competition concerns and the 
proposed commitments in the Market Test Notice must be sufficient for the third parties 
to be able to submit their observations and comments. The market testing phase is a 
special feature of the commitment procedure, which is not present under the standard 
infringement procedure under Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003. This phase enables the 
Commission to put the proposed commitments under the scrutiny of other market 
participants, which supposedly have deeper market knowledge than the Commission. The 
decisional practice of the Commission up to date shows that market testing is an important 
procedural step since it often results in modification of the proposed commitments. 
Market testing helps the Commission to better assess the possible insufficiency and 
                                                 
85 Ibid., para 111. 
86 See, e.g., Case COMP/39.525 Telekomunikacja Polska, Commission Decision of 22 June 2011, para. 12. 
87 Regulation 1/2003, Art. 27 (4). 
88 Notice on Best Practices, op. cit. 43, para. 114. 
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appropriateness of the commitments.89 If, based on the market test, the Commission finds 
that the commitments do not adequately address its competition concerns, it will allow 
the undertaking to submit an amended version of the commitments or to offer 
new/additional commitments to fix the insufficiency. If the market test reveals additional 
competition concerns, not previously considered in Commission´s preliminary 
assessment, the Commission is obliged to issue a new preliminary assessment.90 
However, if the market test indicated the commitments are inadequate or if the 
undertaking fails to submit amended commitments, the Commission might revert to the 
procedure under Article 7.91 Another alternative outcome of the market test is that the 
Commission may find that the concerns expressed in the preliminary assessment were 
unfounded and the commitments are not necessary.92     
iv. Final draft of the commitment decision 
Before formally adopting a decision and making the commitments binding, the 
Commission consults the draft of the final decision with the Member State Advisory 
Committee, which is composed of representatives of NCAs of the Member States.93 
Pursuant to Art. 14 of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission must consult with the Advisory 
Committee prior taking any decision based on Regulation 1/2003, including commitment 
decisions.94 Based on the consultation, Opinion of the Committee is issued, which must 
state whether the Committee agrees with the Commission on the conclusion of the 
proceedings by means of a commitment decision, whether the commitments offered by 
the undertaking are sufficient and proportionate to address Commissions concerns 
expressed in the preliminary assessment (or, in some cases, the statement of objections), 
                                                 
89 RAB, S., MONNOYEUR, D., SUKHTANKAR, A., “Commitments in EU Competition Cases: Article 9 
of Regulation 1/2003, its application and the challenges ahead”, Journal of European Competition Law & 
Practice, 2010, Vol. 1, No. 3., p. 174. 
90 See, e. g., Case COMP/D2/39.654 Reuters Instrument Codes (RICs), Commission Decision of 20 
December 2012.  
91 Notice on Best Practices, op. cit. 43, para. 118. 
92 RAB, S., MONNOYEUR, D., SUKHTANKAR, A., op. ci. 90, p. 175. 
93 Regulation 1/2003, Art. 14 (1). 
94 Regulation 1/2003, Art. 14 (1) states that the committee must be consulted prior to the taking of any 
decision under Articles 7, 8, 9, 10, 23, Article 24(2) and Article 29(1). 
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and finally, whether there are no longer grounds for action by the Commission.95 In the 
Final Report, the Hearing Officer summarises the procedural steps taken by the 
Commission, particularly focusing on market testing of the proposed commitments. The 
Final Report also states whether the particular case raised any concerns as to the exercise 
of procedural rights between the parties and DG competition. Undertakings, which offer 
commitments to the Commission, may at any time during the proceedings call upon the 
Hearing Officer to ensure that procedural rights of the parties are exercised in an effective 
manner.96 
Soon after the Opinion of the Advisory Committee and the Final Report of the Hearing 
Officer are published, the Commission adopts the final commitment decision, which is 
subsequently published (decisions used to be also published in French and German 
versions, but this practice seems to have been abandoned) together with the final version 
of the commitments in its original version (as submitted by the undertakings concerned) 
and a summary of the decision in all EU languages is published in the Official Journal. 
4.3 Shortcomings of the commitment procedure   
The commitment procedure should be designed to ensure fast resolution of Commission´s 
antitrust concerns. However, the procedure contains certain deficiencies in undermining 
the rapid adoption of a commitment decision.  
4.3.1 Offering commitments in advanced stage of investigation 
Firstly, although being encouraged to contact the Commission to discover its readiness to 
discuss possible commitments at the earliest stage, the undertakings can do so at any point 
in time. Even in advanced stages of investigation the Commission might still be tempted 
to accept commitments. That inevitably leads to the postponement of the adoption of a 
                                                 
95 By contrast, prior to issuing an infringement decision, the Opinion states, whether the committee agrees 
with the Commission on (i) whether there was an abuse of a dominant position / the behaviour constitutes 
an agreement within a meaning of Art. 101 with an object/effect of restriction of competition (ii) final 
amount of fine, (iii) definition of relevant product and geographic market, (iv) that there are no mitigating 
or aggravating circumstances to be taken into account, etc. 
96 Decision of the President of the European Commission of 13 October 2011 on the function and terms of 
reference of the hearing officer in certain competition proceedings, 2011/695/EU, Art. 15(1).  
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final decision which should bring a positive impact on the market. Moreover, the 
Commission may also accept commitments even after the statement of objections has 
been issued.  
4.3.2 Offering commitments after the statement of objections has been issued 
Even though a statement of objections had been issued, the Commission accepted 
commitments in 15 out of 36 cases, which represents 42% of all commitment decision 
between years 2005 - 2016.97 The statement of objections contains all objections raised 
against the parties to the proceedings and should be “prepared in view of the nature and 
structure of the final decision that might be adopted”.98 Although not public, the 
statement of objections can be generally regarded as a document, based on which the 
Commission intends to build its final decision, putting forward all the facts and evidence 
gathered during the investigation with considerably higher standard of reasoning in 
comparison to a preliminary assessment. As such, it reveals the strength of Commission´s 
case to the party, to whom it is addressed, including information on whether the 
Commission intends to impose fines and remedies.99 In such cases, undertakings might 
presumably offer more onerous far-reaching commitments for the Commission to be 
satisfied and to resort to adoption of commitment decision after all.  On the one hand, 
when the Commission accepts commitments after it had issued a statement of objections, 
it indicates that the potentially unlawful behaviour of specific company has been properly 
investigated and the Commission has established a solid theory of harm backed up by 
sufficient evidence, which would hold up in court, as “questions of fact and law must 
conform to standards of evidence set by the European Courts”100. That implies that the 
Commission does not only have a competition concern about a potential infringement as 
is the case with a preliminary assessment but that the Commission considers that Article 
101 or 102 have in fact been infringed and the enforcer is convinced that the prohibition 
decision would be upheld in court. On the other hand, all the time and cost savings 
                                                 
97 See Annex n. 2, Table of commission´s decisions. 
98 Manual of Procedures, op. cit. 46, chapter 11, para. 7. 
99 Judgement of the General Court in Case T-395/94, Atlantic Container Line AB and Others v Commission 
of the European Communities, ECR II-875, para. 418. 
100 European Commission, ‘To commit or not to commit? Deciding between prohibition and commitments’, 
Competition policy brief, Issue 3, March 2014, p. 1. 
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associated with the less thorough investigation and drafting of preliminary assessment 
with lower demands on the standard of reasoning and evidence are absent. If the 
commitments are offered after the statement of objection has been issued, the 
Commission is still obliged to market test them. That further delays the adoption of a final 
decision which should bring positive impact on the market, even in comparison with 
prohibition decisions. Based on these considerations, as far as the quickness of the 
procedure goes, limitation of accepting commitments only to cases, where a statement of 
objections has not yet been issued is preferable.101  
4.3.3 Start of negotiations with the Commission   
As mentioned above, the Commission normally expresses its views on the case to the 
parties to the proceedings during a State of Play meeting. The description of the case in 
the State of Play meeting thus bears a significant importance, as it represents the main 
basis for the company under investigation to conclude, whether to submit commitments 
or not.102 That indicates that undertakings concerned express their willingness to submit 
commitments and subsequently negotiate with the Commission before the Preliminary 
Assessment is issued. An example of this practice is the Coca-Cola case,103 where the 
negotiations between the Commission and the company had already been going on for 
several months and had also been consulted with interested third parties, even before the 
preliminary assessment had been issued.104105 This practice raises questions about its 
legitimacy as it suggests the commitments, in fact, do not address Commission´s concerns 
expressed in its preliminary assessment,106 as this document was issued after a successful 
negotiation on commitments. Despite these legitimacy issues, such approach positively 
contributes to the quickness of the procedure as it considerably minimalizes the time lag 
                                                 
101 Such is the case of France, where commitments may no longer be proposed once a statement of objection 
has been issued, see Autorité de la Concurrence, Notice on Competition Commitments Issued on 2 March 
2009, p. 4, para. 13. 
102 Manual of Procedures, op. cit. 46, chapter 16, para. 20. 
103 Case COMP/A.39.116/B2 Coca-Cola, Commission Decision of 29. September 2005. 
104 COOK, CH. J., op. cit. 53, p. 216. 
105 See also Final report of the Hearing Officer in case COMP/A.39.116/B2 — Coca-Cola, 2005/C 239/09, 
which states that the preliminary assessment was issued on 15 October 2004 and the parties submitted 
commitments on 19 October 2004. 
106 As provided for in Article 9(1) of Regulation 1/2003. 
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between the adoption of a preliminary assessment and the submission of commitments. 
Additionally, if the Commission adopts a preliminary assessment prior to any discussions 
on commitments, it sends a clear message that the Commission aims to settle the case 
rather than adopt an infringement decision. The Commission itself acknowledges that it 
firstly explores the readiness of the parties to settle the case by a way of commitments 
before engaging into commitment procedure, prior to submitting the preliminary 
assessment.107  
4.3.4 Substantial amendments to the commitments after the market test, offering 
more sets of commitments   
Another shortcoming of the procedure is related to the phase of market testing of proposed 
commitments and its outcome. Market testing has proven to be a valuable step in the 
procedure, both by improving transparency and by identifying issues not previously 
foreseen by the Commission. Although the outcome of market testing puts a substantial 
pressure on the Commission to adequately evaluate the validity of third parties´ comments 
(especially those of competitors) it should still be regarded as a vital part of the procedure. 
If the market testing reveals insufficiencies of commitments formerly offered, the 
Commission allows the undertakings to submit amended version of the commitments. 
However, if these new commitments are substantially different108 in comparison with the 
former, the Commission must repeat the phase of market testing, which inevitably results 
into postponement of the final decision.  
If the commitments require substantial amendments it indicates that the first set of 
commitments had such deficiencies that even their mere adjustment cannot secure their 
capability to address Commission´s concerns. For the sake of quickness of the procedure, 
the possibility to offer revised commitments should be limited only to unsubstantial 
revisions which do not require additional market testing. As a result, if the first set of 
commitments fails to pass the market testing phase, the Commission should revert to 
infringement procedure. 
                                                 
107 Manual of Procedures, op. cit. 46, chapter 16, para. 10. 
108 Manual of Procedures, op. cit. 46, chapter 16, para. 67. 
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Lastly, the CJEU in the Alrosa judgement confirmed the possibility for companies to offer 
multiple sets of commitments, from which the Commission must make binding only the 
least onerous set, which is still capable of addressing the concerns expressed in the 
preliminary assessment.109 Putting aside the high amount of risk it presents for the 
companies,110 such practice forces the Commission to assess all the proposed sets of 
commitments, thereby slowing the progress leading towards the adoption of a final 
decision.    
4.4 Analysis of the length of commitment procedure    
The previous chapters described the rules on commitment procedures, which should 
enable the Commission to adopt a final decision by rendering the commitments offered 
by the undertakings concerned binding and certain shortcomings which can prolong the 
proceedings. This chapter focuses on the actual decisional practice of the Commission 
with the aim to analyse, whether the assumption of faster proceedings has been confirmed 
in practice.111 This chapter also aims to explore whether the identified shortcomings have 
proven to have a negative effect on the duration of the procedure.  
It is important to note at this point that commitment decisions are rarely challenged in the 
General Court. A commitment decision has never been challenged by the company which 
offered commitments which can be contributed to the consensual nature of this type of 
decision. There have been cases of third parties challenging commitment decision but as 
the next chapter will explain, the scope of judicial review is limited. The de-facto absence 
of judicial review saves a substantial amount of resources for both the Commission and 
parties and enables the Commission to investigate other potential infringements of EU 
competition rules.  
                                                 
109 Judgement in the Case C-441/07 P Commission v Alrosa [2010] ECR I-5949, para. 41. 
110 Such as the possibility for the Commission to continue in proceedings leading to a prohibition decision 
or the inability to appeal the decision based on incorrectly selected set of commitments by the Commission, 
See on this so-called „salami tactics”: WAGENER-VON PAPP, F., ‘Best and even Better Practices in 
Commitment Procedures after Alrosa: the Dangers of Abandoning the „Struggle for Competition Law”’, 
Common Market Law Review, Volume 49 (3), [2012], page 937. 
111 The analysis is based on author´s own research based on the information in Commission´s publicly 




In total, the Commission adopted 55 decisions under Regulation 1/2003 between the years 
2005 – 2016, out of these 19 being prohibition decisions and 35 commitment decisions, 
excluding decisions in cases of secret cartels. Out of 35 commitment decisions, 15 
concerned application of Article 101 TFEU on agreements, 21 related to the application 
of Article 102 TFEU on abuse of dominance. Out of 19 prohibition decision the ratio was 
10 decisions concerning Article 101 TFEU and 9 concerning Article 102 TFEU. 







35 commitment decisions 15 decisions concerning Article 101 TFEU  
21 decisions concerning Article 102 TFEU  
19 prohibition decisions 10 decisions concerning Article 101 TFEU  
9 decisions concerning Article 102 TFEU  
Chart 1. Overview of Commission´s decisions112 
                                                 
112 Based on own research of publicly available information, Commission´s web case search, accessible at: 




An analysis of the length of prohibition decisions in the period between 2005 – 2016 
shows that the average time lag between the opening of the proceedings and the adoption 
of a prohibition decision was 33,5 months with no significant difference between cases 
concerning Article 101 TFEU and Article 102 TFEU.113 On the other hand, according to 
an analysis of commitment decisions in the same period, the average time lag between 
the opening of the proceedings and the adoption of commitment decision was 31,2 
months, while the time lag in decisions concerning Article 101 TFEU is 34,7 months 
compared to 28,7 in cases concerning Article 102 TFEU.114 That can be contributed to 
the fact that in cases related to agreements there are more parties to the proceedings, 
which makes it more difficult for the Commission to negotiate on commitments.115 
The average time lag in the proceedings stated above suggests a marginal difference in 
the length of the two procedures.  
                                                 
113 In average, the time lag in proceeding concerning Article 101 TFEU was 33,9 months compared to 33,2 
months in cases concerning Article 102 TFEU. 
114 See Annex n. 2, Table of commission´s decisions. 
115 See, e.g. Case AT.39850 Container Shipping, Commission Decision of 7 July 2016, where there were 
14 companies each submitting commitments and the it took the Commission 56 months to adopt a final 
commitment decision.  
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Chart 1. Overview of the average time lag in the proceedings.  
 
An important remark must be made at this point. In 10 cases, which ended with adoption 
of a prohibition decision, the Commission initiated the proceedings by sending a 
statement of objections to the parties. That means that prior to that date a hardly 
measurable amount of time has passed, in which the Commission had investigated the 
particular matter, carried out dawn raids, requested information from the investigated 
companies and other players on the market, built up the case and prepared the statement 
of objections. In comparison, in cases, which ended by the adoption of a commitment 
decision, the Commission had started the proceedings in average nearly 17 months before 
it adopted a preliminary assessment or a statement of objections. Therefore, for more 
relevance of the statistics, the length of the procedure in commitment cases should be 
compared to the time lag in 9 prohibition cases, in which the Commission had started the 
proceedings before it sent a statement of objections to the parties.116 In these proceedings, 
it took the Commission in average 45 months from the initiation of the proceedings to the 
                                                 
116 Those being: Case COMP/D1/38606 Groupement des Cartes Bancaries; Case COMP/34.579 
MasterCard; Case COMP/39.525 Telekomunikacja Polska; Case AT.39226 Lundbeck; Case AT.39685 
Fentanyl; Case AT.39984 OPCOM; Case AT.39985 Motorola; Case AT.39612 Peridopril (Servier); Case 
AT.39523 Slovak Telekom  




Average time lag between the initiation of the proceedings 
and the adoption of a final decision
Prohibition decision Commitment decision
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adoption of a prohibition decision. This finding demonstrates that, in general, 
commitment decisions provide for earlier resolution of a case and thus restoring the 
correct functioning of the market.   
4.5 Impact of the shortcomings on the quickness of the commitment 
procedure 
In the previous chapter of this thesis the author identified certain shortcomings, which 
may lengthen the procedure leading to the adoption of commitment decisions. This 
section aims to analyse their actual impact on the length of the commitment procedure in 
Commission´s decisional practice.  
The possibility to negotiate commitments with the Commission at any point during the 
proceedings will be scrutinised first. In general, it is without a doubt that the sooner the 
negotiations on possible commitments begin and the undertaking concerned submits its 
commitments, the earlier the Commission can assess, whether they sufficiently address 
its competition concerns stemming from company´s conduct and trigger the market 
testing phase. The quickness of the phase in which the Commission assesses the conduct 
of the undertaking concerned and negotiates on possible commitments will inevitably 
depend on numerous factors, such as the complexity of the antitrust issue, the success of 
the initial commitment proposals and the overall rapidness of the discussions. However, 
as these factors are not measurable and will depend to a great extent on the specifics of 
each case, the analysis will focus on the difference between cases where the Commission 
adopted a preliminary assessment and where it adopted a statement of objections. As 
mentioned above, in the period between the years 2005 - 2016 the Commission accepted 
commitments after issuing a statement of objections in 15 cases, which is nearly 42% of 
all cases. The analysis of Commission´s commitment decisions confirms that in 
comparison with cases, where only a preliminary assessment was issued, the adoption of 
a statement of objections had a negative impact on the quickness of the procedure. It took 
the Commission on average 56% longer to adopt a commitment decision from the 
initiation of the proceedings in cases where a statement of objections has been issued than 
in cases where a preliminary assessment has been adopted: 39 months against 25,5 
months, which diminishes the time savings gained by the commitment procedure 
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identified in the previous section of this thesis. Largest time lag, on average of 15 months, 
is unsurprisingly created between the moment the Commission sends a statement of 
objections to the undertaking(s) until it issues a market test notice. In cases where a 
preliminary assessment is issued instead of statement of objections, it takes on average 
only 3,3 months for the Commission to put the submitted commitments to market testing. 
This time lag proves the presumption that the discussions on the possible commitments 
take place after the statement of objections is issued, which makes the whole procedure 
considerably longer and postpones the adoption of the final decision. Based on these 
findings it can be concluded that allowing companies to offer commitments even after the 
statement of objections had been sent to them has a negative effect on the quickness of 
the procedure.             
The analysis of Commission´s commitment decisions also proves other two assertions 
made in the previous chapters. Firstly, cases where the Commission discusses the 
commitments with the undertakings concerned before it adopts a preliminary assessment 
are resolved more quickly. In these cases, the Commission issued the market test notice 
within days after the preliminary assessment, which shows that the main part of the 
discussions was carried out before. The average length the proceedings in 5 cases, where 
the market test notice was published within 20 days after the preliminary assessment was 
only 15 months.117 Secondly, although it had happened only in the Reuters Instrumental 
Codes case118, substantial amendments to the proposed commitments after the first market 
test leading to second market test prolonged the proceedings by 7 months, which 
demonstrates the negative impact of the possibility to substantially amend the proposed 
commitments on the overall length of the proceedings. 
                                                 
117 Those being: Case COMP/39.317 E.ON Gas; Case COMP/39.316 GDF; Case COMP/39.692 IBM 
Maintenance Services; Case COMP/39.847 E-BOOKS; Case AT.39727 CEZ.  
118 Case COMP/D2/39.654 Reuters Instrument Codes (RICs). 
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4.6 Quickness of the commitment procedure in particular sectors   
The Commission stresses out the importance of a quick resolution of cases in markets in 
the process of liberalisation, most notably in the energy sector.119 The statistics reveal that 
the Commission was particularly keen to accept commitments in the energy sector - 12 
commitment decisions have been adopted in this sector since 2005, which amounts to 
33% of all decisions. An analysis of these decisions confirms the proceedings in these 
cases were quicker, in average it took the Commission 25,5 months to adopt the final 
decision. However, two notes have to be made at this point. Firstly, in three of the cases120 
it took the Commission more than 3 years to adopt the final decision, which aggravates 
the average time lag in this sector, as some decisions have been taken particularly 
quickly.121 The second point relates to the Gazprom case122, in which the Commission 
opened the proceedings in 2012, sent a statement of objections in 2015 and only recently, 
in March 2017 issued a market test notice. After 5 years since the proceedings were 
opened it is apparent that the Commission will not succeed to quickly resolve the case, 
despite the commitments were put to market testing recently.123   
The quickness of the antitrust intervention and its precise timing is of a particular 
importance in fast moving markets, such as IT and other digital markets to achieve the 
desired result of the enforcement action.124 It follows that the Commission may be 
favoured to opt for commitment decisions instead of a lengthy procedure leading to the 
                                                 
119 See, e.g., Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Directorate for Financial and 
Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee, Commitment Decisions in Antitrust Cases, Note by the 
European Union, DAF/COMP/WD(2016)22,  page 6, (Commitment Decisions in Antitrust Cases, Note by 
the European Union) available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/WD(2016)22&do
clanguage=en; ALMUNIA, Joaquín, „Remedies, commitments and settlements in antitrust“, op. cit. 69. 
120 See Case COMP/B-1/37.966 Distrigaz, in which it took 44 months to adopt the final decision, Case 
COMP/39.315 ENI, with 41 months and Case AT.39767 BEH Electricity with 37 months. In all these cases, 
a statement of objections was issued rather than a preliminary analysis. 
121 See Case COMP/39.317 Cases COMP/39.388 German Electricity Wholesale Market and COMP/39.389 
German Electricity Balancing Market, in which the proceedings took only 203 days or Case COMP/39.317 
E.ON Gas, with 196 days.  
122 Case AT.39816 Upstream gas supplies in Central and Eastern Europe. 
123 see European Commission, Commission invites comments on Gazprom commitments concerning 
Central and Eastern European gas markets, Press release from 13 March 2017, IP/17/555, accessible at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-555_en.htm.  
124 See ALMUNIA, Joaquín, „Remedies, commitments and settlements in antitrust“, op. cit. 69. 
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adoption of an infringement decision. Moreover, longer proceedings may lead to an 
outdated decision, which does not reflect the business reality, as it may develop faster 
than the investigation.125 In these cases, commitment decisions should be generally able 
to remove the possible anticompetitive conduct and restore the market conditions 
faster.126 Incorrectly assessing and punishing conduct on these markets could possibly 
lead to undesirable effects on the market and hamper further innovation. The most striking 
example of overly lengthy proceedings is the Google case127, concerning alleged abuse 
of dominant market position by favouring its own vertical services by displaying these in 
a different way than it did in the case of competitor´s web pages by Google´s web search 
algorithm. The investigation has been ongoing for nearly 7 years, Google had offered 
commitments which were market tested by the Commission and subsequently rejected on 
the basis of negative responses by complainants for their insufficiency128. On 27 June 
2017 the Commission adopted a prohibition decision fining Google EUR 2.42 billion.129 
As such, adopting a prohibition decision seems desirable – Google failed to provide 
satisfactory commitments in a due time to effectively address Commission´s concern so 
a prohibition decision sanctioning Google seems a preferable option. On the other hand, 
it is remarkable that the company have received by far the largest penalty imposed in a 
prohibition decision, while it had previously negotiated commitments on commitments 
with the Commission.   
                                                 
125 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise 
Affairs Competition Committee, Commitment Decisions in Antitrust Cases, Background paper by the 
Secretariat, DAF/COMP(2016)7, para. 30. 
126 See, to that conclusion, DOMANICO, F., ANGELI, M., ‘An analysis of the IBM Commitment Decision 
concerning the aftermarket for IBM mainframe maintenance’, accessible at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/2012_1_1_en.pdf. 
127 Cases COMP/C-3/39.740, COMP/C-3/39.775 & COMP/C-3/39.768 – Google. According to a Memo 
from 5. 1. 2014, the Commission sent a Statement of Objections to Google on 15. 4. 2015 and opened 
separate formal investigation on Android. On 14. 7. 2016 the Commission sent Google a supplementary 
statement of objections regarding results of its search engines. 
128 WEBER, R. H., ‘From competition law to sector-specific regulation in internet markets? A critical 
assessment of a possible structural change’ in DREXL, J., DI PORTO, F. (eds), Competition Law as 
Regulation, ASCOLA Competition Law series, Edward Elgar Publishing [2015], p. 257. 
129 European Commission, Commission fines Google EUR 2.42 billion for abusing dominance as search 
engine by giving illegal advantage to own comparison shopping service, Press release from 27 July 2017, 
IP/17/1784, accessible at <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1784_en.htm>. 
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In other cases in the digital sector the resolution of a case came considerably faster; it 
took the Commission to issue a final decision 17 months in the IBM case 130, 24 months 
in the Microsoft case131 and 28 months in the Rambus case132. A comparison with 
Commission´s proceedings in the Intel case133, which took 22 months, is not 
representative as the Commission had been investigated company´s conduct for 3 years 
prior to notifying a statement of objections and opening the proceedings.134 
4.7 Effectiveness of the commitment procedure: Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to explore the various features of the commitment procedure, which 
have both positive and negative impact on its quickness. In general, the analysis showed 
that the Commission can benefit from the less formal procedure and that it reaches the 
final decision earlier than in cases where a prohibition decision is adopted. However, the 
procedure also involves several shortcomings, which have proved to negatively affect the 
speediness of the resolution of Commission´s competition concerns. The table below 
summarises the main findings of this chapter: 
Positive effect  Negative effect  
- More streamlined and less 
formalised procedure  
- Parties approach the commission 
in an advanced stage of the 
investigation 
- Preliminary assessment – lower 
demands on reasoning, 
considerably shorter  
- Preparation of a statement of 
objections 
- Parties approach the Commission 
at the earliest stage possible 
- Substantial amendments to 
commitments and second market 
test 
- Preliminary assessment tailored to 
the commitments  
- Offering sets of commitments for 
the Commission to choose from 
                                                 
130 Case COMP/39.692 IBM Maintenance Services  
131 Case COMP/39.530 Microsoft (Tying). 
132 Case COMP/38.636 RAMBUS. 
133 Case COMP/C-3/37.990 Intel. 
134 Case COMP/C-3/37.990 Intel, Commission Decision of 13 May 2009, para. 7. 
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5. EFFECTIVENESS OF COMMITMENTS 
The essential component of commitment decisions, which makes the final impact on the 
market, is enshrined in commitments, which are voluntary offered by the undertaking and 
made legally binding by Commission´s decision. A commitment decision generally 
contains a description of Commission´s preliminary assessment of its competition 
concerns in terms of the relevant market affected by the undertaking´s conduct, the 
procedure which led to the adoption of Commission´s decision and finally Commission´s 
assessment of proposed commitments, their proportionality and the outcome of the 
market test. As the commitment decisions aim to ensure that the EU competition rules are 
applied effectively, the commitments must ensure an effective resolution of the 
competition problem. The aim of this chapter is to analyse what contributes to the 
effectiveness of the resolution of a competition problem by commitments. Firstly, this 
chapter outlines the basic rules, which relate to commitments, followed by an analysis of 
features contributing to the enhanced effectiveness of commitment decision in 
comparison to remedies, which can be imposed in prohibition decisions. Last part of this 
chapter is dedicated to examination of the decisional practice of the Commission with the 
aim to analyse, how the possibility to accept commitments enhanced the effectiveness of 
Commission´s antitrust enforcement.  
5.1 Commitments and their content  
In previous chapters, the author outlined the legal framework for accepting commitments 
and the procedure leading to the adoption thereof. For the purpose of assessing the 
effectiveness of the commitments, this chapter will briefly describe the rules applicable 
to commitments and their content.     
Generally, commitments can be either of a behavioural or structural nature. Behavioural 
commitments involve the conduct of the undertaking and seek to alter the behaviour of 
the company. Structural commitments entail a change in the structure of an undertaking, 
usually by divesting a part of its business. Moreover, proposed commitments must be 
unambiguous and self-executing which means that they cannot depend on actions of a 
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third party who is not legally bound by the commitments. 135 In some cases, where the 
commitments are too complicated to be precisely determined, it might be more efficient 
to adopt a prohibition decision and impose the company a cease and desist order and 
allow the company to determine its own way how to comply with the order.136 In case the 
commitments must inevitably depend on agreement with third parties, the undertaking 
submitting the commitments must provide evidence that such agreement can be reached 
when it submits its commitment proposal.137  
Furthermore, the commitments submitted by the undertakings concerned should be 
designed to be easily and quickly implemented. Monitoring of compliance with the 
decision is fundamental to guarantee the effectiveness of these decisions.138 The tools 
used for monitoring of compliance vary depending on numerous factors, such as the 
nature of the commitments and their scope, size of the undertaking or the structure of the 
relevant market.139 One of the means of such monitoring is appointment an independent 
trustee, who is controlling the compliance with the commitments. Independent trustees 
are mainly appointed in cases involving structural commitments to monitor the 
implementation of thereof140, however, there are also cases where an independent trustee 
has been appointed to supervise the compliance with behavioural commitments.141 The 
Commission may also monitor the compliance with the commitments by requiring the 
company to submit reports on the compliance with the commitments.142 Interested third 
parties may also help the Commission in monitoring, especially those, who benefit from 
companies’ compliance with the commitments.143 Another option for the Commission is 
                                                 
135 ECN Recommendation on Commitment Procedures, op. cit. 44, para 18; Manual of Procedures, op. cit. 
43, chapter 16, para. 46. 
136 Commitment Decisions in Antitrust Cases, Note by the European Union, op. cit. 121, para 34.  
137 Manual of Procedures, op. cit. 46, chapter 16, para. 48; Notice on Best Practices, op. cit. 43, para. 128. 
138 ECN Recommendation on Commitment Procedures, op. cit. 46, para. 19. 
139 Ibid.  
140 See, e.g. Case AT.39727 CEZ, Commission Decision of 10 April 2013. 
141 See, e.g., Case AT.39939 Samsung, Commission Decision of 24 April 2014, para. 81. 
142 See, e.g., Case COMP/A.39.116/B2 Coca-Cola, Commission Decision of 29. September 2005, Case 
COMP/ 39.351 Swedish Interconnectors, Commission Decision of 14 April 2010. 
143 Interested third parties unsuccessfully complained on failure to comply with the commitments made 
binding by Commission Decision in COMP/B-1/38.348 — Repsol CPP, which was rejected by 
Commissions Decision C(2011) 2994 and the appeal by the third party dismissed in judgment of the General 




to cooperate with sectoral regulators or other public bodies, who might be better suited to 
monitor the compliance.144  The Commission acknowledges the fact that behavioural 
commitments require long-term monitoring, thus necessarily involve more resources to 
be spent, in contrast with one-off structural commitments.145 Moreover, commitments 
may be (and in practice they often are) binding on the undertaking for a specified period 
of time, after which the Commission re-assesses them and decides, whether they are still 
necessary. The Commission may also reopen the proceedings and review the 
commitments on its own initiative or after a request from the parties to the procedure or 
by a third parties´ complaint, in case of a material change in the facts on which the 
decision was based pursuant to Article 9(2)a) of Regulation 1/2003.    
The fundamental requirement of any commitment submitted by a party to the proceedings 
is that it must address the competition concern identified by the Commission. 
Commitments not fulfilling this precondition will be rejected by the Commission at the 
outset.146  
5.2 The proportionality of commitments  
While assessing whether the commitments sufficiently address identified competition 
concerns, the Commission must determine, whether the commitments are proportional 
and whether they do not go beyond what is necessary to remedy the competition 
concern.147 Regulation 1/2003 addresses the issue of proportionality only in regard to 
remedies, which may be imposed in a prohibition decision.148 As already mentioned in 
chapter 2 of this thesis, the Commission may impose proportionate behavioural or 
structural remedies, which are necessary to effectively put an end to the infringement.149 
Structural remedies can be imposed only when there is no space for an effective 
behavioural remedy. Prior to judgement of the CJEU in the Alrosa case it was rather 
dubious, to which extent does the principle of proportionality apply on commitment 
                                                 
144 ECN Recommendation on Commitment Procedures, op. cit. 46, para. 21. 
145 Manual of Procedures, op. cit. 46, chapter 16, para. 45. 
146 Notice on Best Practices, op. cit. 643, para. 127; Manual of Procedures, op. cit. 45, chapter 16, para. 45. 
147 Manual of Procedures, op. cit. 45, chapter 16, para. 46. 
148 Regulation 1/2003, Article 7(1).   
149 Ibid., see also chapter 2 of this thesis.  
38 
 
decisions. Proportionality, being a general principle of EU law, is a criterion for the 
lawfulness of any act of the institutions of the Union.150  
5.2.1 The Alrosa case: Question of proportionality resolved 
The question of its scope in commitment decisions was central to the first challenge of a 
commitment decision brought to European Courts. To put the judgements of the courts 
into context, it is first necessary to briefly summarise the facts of the case. 
i. Facts of the case 
Alrosa Company Ltd. (“Alrosa”) was the second largest producer and supplier of rough 
diamonds in the world. The De Beers group (“De Beers”), a group of companies 
established in Luxemburg, was the largest producer and supplier of rough diamonds in 
the world. In March 2002, these two companies notified an agreement for the supply of 
rough diamonds in which they had entered in December 2001, seeking negative clearance 
or an exemption from the Commission under Regulation 17/62. The agreement provided 
that during a 5-year period Alrosa undertakes to sell rough diamonds produced in Russia 
to De Beers, limited to the value of USD 800 million a year, amounting to half of Alrosa´s 
production exported outside the Community of Independent States, while De Beers agrees 
to purchase these diamonds from Alrosa. Under the agreement, Alrosa could reduce the 
value of sales to USD 700 million in the last 2 years of the 5-year period.  
However, the Commission had not cleared the agreement, neither had it exempted. 
Conversely, the Commission sent a statement of objections to both companies, expressing 
its view that the agreement could constitute an anticompetitive agreement prohibited by 
Article 101 of the TFEU. Moreover, the Commission issued a separate statement of 
objections addressed to De Beers, stating that the agreement could constitute an abuse of 
dominant position. After an oral hearing with both parties, the companies jointly 
submitted commitments, which provided for a reduction of the value of sales from Alrosa 
to De Beers from USD 700 million in 2005 to USD 275 million in 2010 and following 
years and afterwards to be capped at that level. Subsequently, the Commission put these 
                                                 
150 Judgement of the CJEU in Case C-441/07 P, Commission v Alrosa [2010] ECR I-5949, para. 36. 
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commitments to market testing. Based on the outcome of the market test the Commission 
sought to amend the commitments from the reduction of the value of sales to a complete 
cessation of the business relationship between Alrosa and De Beers from 2009 onwards. 
Following the results of the market test and Commission´s demand to amend the 
commitments De Beers submitted individual commitments, which provided for a 
reduction of purchases from Alrosa by De Beers from USD 600 million in 2006 to USD 
400 million in 2008 and subsequently its complete cessation. In February 2006, the 
Commission adopted a decision, which made the individual commitments by De Beers 
binding.  
ii. Decision of the General Court 
Alrosa brought an action seeking annulment of the decision before the General Court, 
claiming the decision is contrary to Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003, contractual freedom 
and the principle of proportionality because of the excessive nature of the 
commitments.151 The court held that the principle of proportionality applies to 
commitment decisions in the same manner as it applies to prohibition decisions as both 
of these decisions has the same objective, even though Regulation 1/2003 does not 
explicitly refer to this principle in connection with commitment decisions.152 The 
obligation to comply with this principle further stems from the  Recital 34 of the 
Regulation, which states that “this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in 
order to achieve its objective, which is to allow the Community competition rules to be 
applied effectively.“153 Hence, the Commission, while deciding between several possible 
measures, has to apply the least onerous one, which must not be disproportionate to the 
aim pursued. Despite the voluntary nature of the commitments, it is the decision of the 
Commission, which makes them binding. Therefore, the Commission is not relieved to 
comply with the principle of proportionality.154  According to the court, the purpose of 
commitment decisions is to address the concerns of the Commission, expressed in its 
preliminary assessment. The decision sought to provide third parties with an alternative 
                                                 
151 Judgement of the General Court in Case T-170/06, Alrosa v Commission [2007] ECR II-2601, para. 42. 
152 Ibid., para. 92 and 95. 
153 Ibid., para. 93. 
154 Ibid., para. 105. 
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source of supply by discontinuing trading between De Beers and Alrosa, which did not 
allow the latter to become an effective competitor on the market.155 The Commission thus 
failed to carry out a complex economic assessment, which is necessary in order to enable 
an effective judicial review of the proportionality of the measure adopted.156 As a result, 
the decision was vitiated by a manifest error of assessment because the Commission was 
obliged to accept less onerous commitments than those leading to a complete prohibition 
of purchases from Alrosa by De Beers. The court concluded that such less onerous 
commitments were also those jointly offered by De Beers and Alrosa. Accordingly, the 
court held that the Commission cannot lawfully accept commitments, which are more 
onerous than it could accept under Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003.  
The judgement of the General Court, which enabled the courts to review the adequacy 
and proportionality of commitments, was deemed as a desirable approach by some 
commentators.157 In commitment decisions adopted after General Court´s ruling the 
Commission started to assess the proportionality of the final commitments in its 
decisions, aware of the risk its decisions might be challenged on grounds of non-
proportionality of the commitments. The most evident example is the first decision issued 
after the judgement in the Distrigaz case, which contains a comprehensive section on the 
proportionality of the commitments.158 Some commentators suggested that the CISAC 
case159 represents an example of the reduction of the attractiveness of commitment 
decisions for the Commission after General court´s ruling.160 Shortly before the General 
Court handed down its judgement in Alrosa case the Commission had market tested 
commitments in the CISAC case. After the market test, the Commission rejected the 
commitments and later decided to adopt an infringement decision instead. Arguably, the 
Commission could have rejected the commitments based on the outcomes of the market 
test, but in such scenarios, the Commission usually lets the undertaking offer amended 
                                                 
155 Ibid., para. 119. 
156 Ibid., para. 125. 
157 WAGENER-VON PAPP, F., op. cit. 11, p. 930. 
158 Case COMP/B-1/37.966 Distrigaz, Commission Decision of 15. January 2008, para. 34 – 41; See also 
Case COMP/39.402 RWE Gas Foreclosure, Commission Decision of of 18 March 2009, paras. 46 – 53. 
159 Case COMP/C2/38.698 – CISAC. 
160 WAGENER-VON PAPP, F., op. cit. 11, p. 942. 
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commitments, which better address the results of the market test, rather than resorting to 
adoption of an infringement decision.   
iii. Decision of the CJEU 
The Commission appealed the General Court´s decision claiming misinterpretation of the 
principle of proportionality. The CJEU first noted that “the specific characteristics of the 
mechanisms provided for in Articles 7 and 9 of Regulation No 1/2003 and the means of 
action available under each of those provisions are different“, which means that the 
Commission´s obligation to guarantee that the principle of proportionality is observed 
differs as to the content and extent.161 On the one hand, prohibition decisions identify an 
infringement so the remedies imposed by the Commission must be proportionate and 
necessary to be able to bring the infringement to an end. In commitment decisions, on the 
other hand, the principle of proportionality is limited to verifying whether the 
commitments address the competition concerns expressed by the Commission and 
whether undertaking concerned has not offered less onerous commitments, which are also 
able to address Commission´s concerns. When assessing the appropriateness of the 
commitments, the Commission must consider interests of third parties.162 On these 
grounds, the CJEU concluded that judicial review of commitment decisions should be 
confined to the determination whether the Commission´s assessment is manifestly 
incorrect.163 It follows that undertakings consciously accept that the commitments they 
voluntarily offered may be more onerous than what the Commission could impose in 
prohibition decision after a detailed assessment, but at the same time, it safeguards 
termination of the proceedings without finding an infringement and imposing a fine.164  
The CJEU then considered an argument raised by the Commission claiming the General 
Court incorrectly limited Commission´s discretion to choose which commitments to 
accept. In its judgement, the General Court held that the Commission was obliged to 
accept the joint commitments proposed by Alrosa and De Beers, as they were sufficient 
                                                 
161 Judgement of the CJEU in Case C-441/07 P, Commission v Alrosa [2010] ECR I-5949, para. 38.  
162 Ibid., para. 41.  
163 Ibid., para. 42. 
164 Ibid., para 48. 
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to address its competition concerns. CJEU first stated that the Commission was only 
obliged to assess if these commitments address the competition concerns. In this regard, 
the Commission had, based on the market test, concluded that the commitments were not 
appropriate.165 Based on these considerations the CJEU held that the General Court 
incorrectly held that the Commission´s decision was vitiated by a manifest error in 
assessment. Such conclusion could only have been reached after finding the 
Commission´s conclusion was apparently groundless, with a view to the facts established 
by it.166 The General Court, however, substituted Commission´s assessment of complex 
economic circumstances for its own, thus was usurping the discretion of the Commission, 
instead of reviewing the lawfulness of the assessment.167 This error of the General Court 
was substantial enough in itself for the CJEU to set aside the judgement.168  
5.2.2 Alrosa decision´s contribution to the effectiveness of commitments 
The ruling of the General Court ordered the Commission to fully assess the 
proportionality of the commitments, which could not go beyond what it could itself 
impose in an infringement decision. As a result, the Commission would have to consider 
what remedies it could lawfully impose in an infringement decision while, at the same 
time, negotiating appropriate commitments with the undertaking concerned. Cavicchi 
points out in this regard the Commission would, in fact, carry on two distinct enforcement 
actions in parallel, which would have an adverse impact on the quickness and cost 
saving.169 Moreover, such obligation would confine the effectiveness of the commitments 
the Commission may impose.  
In the context of the effectiveness of commitments, it is essential for the Commission not 
to be constrained by what remedies it could impose in a prohibition decisions. The 
underlying rationale is that commitments differ from remedies, which the Commission 
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may impose in prohibition decisions, as commitments are not intended to put an 
infringement established by the Commission, to an end. Logically, commitment decision 
cannot put an infringement to an end since no infringement was established; they merely 
react to identified competition concerns. As noted by AG Kokkot in the Alrosa case, 
Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 “is not an instrument for establishing infringements of 
competition law, but merely gives the Commission the possibility of effectively addressing 
concerns over competition for the future”.170 Indeed, commitments under Article 9 are 
forward-looking, they aim to adjust undertaking’s future behaviour beyond merely 
ordering to put an infringement to an end. Commitments may also aim to adjust the 
structure of the company, which has a long-lasting effect and prevent from the re-
occurrence of the anticompetitive behaviour indicated by the Commission in the future.171 
To that extent, the Commission must assess the commitments in terms of their expected 
effect on the market. Despite the fact that the proceedings are initiated on the basis of an 
existing conduct of the undertaking, such assessment must include “future oriented 
prospective economic analysis”.172  
Commission´s decisional practice shows that some decisions indeed involved future 
oriented commitments, which can be viewed as the Commission trying to de-facto 
micromanage the markets. Examples of this practice include the Visa case173, in which 
the company committed to cut its interchange fees to a certain level, or the Standard & 
Poor´s case174, in which the decision rendered legally binding company´s commitment to 
provide its International Securities Identification Number to non-banking customers for 
a capped fee of USD15.000 a per year. Another example of Commission adjusting market 
conduct of the companies for the future is the Air France/KLM/Alitalia/Delta case and 
the Continental/United/Lufthansa/Air Canada case, in which it accepted semi-structural 
commitments. These cases concerned cooperation of airlines under a revenue-sharing 
joint venture. The companies undertook to make landing and take-off slots at particular 
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airports on transatlantic routes available for potential competitors, thus effectively 
lowering the barriers to entry on the market.     
Conversely, remedies which are imposed in prohibition decisions aim to re-establish the 
situation that existed before the infringement occurred.175 In some cases, the basic 
remedy, cease and desist order, is sufficient because requiring the undertaking to comply 
with the order is straightforward enough. When the Commission believes that it needs to 
specify the required measures so the undertaking complies with competition rules, it may 
impose specific measures the undertaking needs to adopt.176 However, these remedies 
cannot go beyond their purpose of restoration of effective competition on the market, so 
they cannot aim to avoid the risk of repetition of the anticompetitive conduct in the 
future.177 It follows that commitment decisions are especially suitable when there is more 
to gain from fixing the market to function properly in the future, rather than punishing 
undertakings for their behaviour in the past.178 
5.3 Better tailored commitments  
Having a wide margin of discretion and not being constrained by what remedies it could 
impose by virtue of a prohibition decision the commitment procedure enables the 
Commission to accept commitments which can effectively address identified competition 
concerns.179 Market testing of the commitments is an important tool helping to further 
fine-tune the commitments. Moreover, as commitments are offered by the undertaking 
itself they are presumably implemented more easily and quickly than remedies imposed 
unilaterally by the enforcer. Admittedly, Commitment decisions are particularly suited 
for cases where the underlying competition problem cannot be solved by a cease and 
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desist order. In these cases, the use of commitments to restore competitive market 
conditions has proven to serve better for this purpose.  
It is in the interest of the parties to the proceedings to find a reasonable, easy to implement 
and well-defined solution. Unilaterally imposed remedies by the Commission in a 
prohibition decision following adversarial proceedings might easily be lacking the desired 
result.180  An example of such ill-defined remedies imposed by the Commission are the 
remedies imposed in the Microsoft case181. The Commission found the company had 
abused its dominant position by bundling Windows Media Player with Windows and by 
not providing adequate documentation to enable interoperability of Microsoft servers. 
The Commission, besides charging the company with a hefty fine, imposed two remedies 
– to put a version of Windows without Windows Media Player (Windows – N) on the 
market and to publish information enabling interoperability. These remedies, which were 
also confirmed by the General Court182, have proven to be a failure, as the sales of the 
Windows – N were close to zero and there have been only several server entries.183 It 
necessarily follows that the market impact of such remedies is limited, if not non-existent.  
Against the failure of these remedies, the commitments in the following case with the 
same company, the Microsoft (tying) case184, should be briefly addressed. In short, in this 
case, the Commission had concerns that the company abused its dominant position by 
tying its Internet Explorer web browser to its Windows operating system. The 
commitments provided for introducing a “Choice Screen”, on which the users could select 
their preferred web browser and disclose information enabling interoperability. The 
Commission did not disclose any detailed statistics regarding the actual effects of the 
commitments, it only published information in its press release that 84 million browsers 
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were downloaded via the “Choice Screen”.185 Based on this information it can be 
concluded that the “Choice Screen” enabled the consumers to make an option regarding 
the installation of a web browser, although more detailed statistics about the impact on 
downloads of competing browsers would be needed to fully assess the effectiveness of 
the commitment. It should be noted that Microsoft was fined for not pre-installing the 
Choice screen in one of his software, thus for failing to comply with the commitment.186   
5.4 Commission´s decisional practice under Article 9  
As mentioned above, the Commission has accepted commitments in 35 cases since the 
entry into force of Regulation 1/2003. This section aims to explore how the Commission 
enforced EU competition rules by accepting commitments by examining its decisional 
practice with a view to evaluate how commitment decisions enabled the Commission to 
effectively deal with its competition concerns. Moreover, the analysis of the decisional 
practice enables to identify weak points, which may have a detrimental impact on the 
effectiveness of commitments.187  
5.4.1 Commitment decisions as a continuation of the notification procedure 
The initial cases, in which the Commission made use of commitment decisions mirrored 
the notification procedure under Regulation 17/62. As it was described in the second 
chapter of this thesis, under Regulation 17/62 companies could seek an exemption of an 
agreement under Article 101(3) TFEU. In these cases, commitment decisions enabled the 
Commission to provide amendments to partially pro-competitive agreements to meet the 
requirements for granting the exemption under Article 101(3).188  
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The first two decision falling within this group concern football media rights. In both 
Bundesliga189 and Premier League190 the Commission was concerned that the joint sale 
of media rights between the clubs participating in the respective league would restrict 
competition between the clubs and raise prices, while at the same time, providers of new 
media services could not broadcast matches. The commitments provided that media rights 
will be offered for a maximum of 3 years in several packages in a transparent manner. 
The Commission has also accepted commitments to amend two anticompetitive clauses 
in the Cannes Agreement case191, the agreement between 13 European collecting societies 
and 5 major music studios. One of the clauses concerned rebate payment schemes to 
record producers, the second one a non-compete obligation. In the Repsol case192, the 
Commission adopted a decision which made binding commitments regarding company’s 
vertical agreements on fuel distribution through service stations in Spain. Repsol 
undertook, inter alia, to refrain from restricting purchaser´s ability to set the selling price 
and in the case of agency agreements to from limiting agents from lowering their price 
by cutting down their commission. 
Although not being meant to be a substitute for the formal notification procedure under 
Regulation 17/62, commitment decisions have proved to be an effective tool to amend 
notified agreements to be in line with EU competition rules. However, it is important to 
point out that as a remnant of the pre-modernization system, such use of commitment 
decisions is now obsolete.   
5.4.2 Commitment decisions as a specification of block exemptions  
A commitment decision also served as a tool to de-facto specify the requirement of block 
exemption. A set of cases concerned Commission´s preliminary view that four car 
manufactures193 did not abide by the rules set down in the motor vehicle block exemption 
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regulation 1400/2002194, which provides that the manufactures are obliged to provide full 
access to technical information must be disclosed to independent repairers. Such 
information has to be accessible in manner proportionate to the needs of the independent 
retailers. The commitments specified the scope of the necessary access to be given to the 
repairers, as well as the scope of technical information and provided a non-exhaustive list 
of examples thereof and the circumstances, under which the manufacturer may withhold 
the information. The decision in the cases with car manufacturers shows the possibility 
of effectively specifying the conditions, under which a block exemption on vertical 
agreements related to motor vehicles applies. Hence, by its decision, the Commission 
gave an important guidance to other car manufacturers, which helped them to better assess 
whether their commercial conduct is in compliance with competition rules.  
5.4.3 Commitments going beyond the scope of the investigation   
Based on the ruling of the CJEU in the Alrosa case, the Commission may accept far-
reaching commitments which go beyond what it could impose in an infringement 
decision. That is “consciously accepted” by the undertaking proposing commitments and 
acknowledged by the court as a favourable trade-off, compared to the finding of an 
infringement and imposition of a fine.195 Undeniably, the Commission will seek to extract 
more concessions from a company hoping to avoid a possible prohibition decision.196 The 
most striking example of such far-reaching commitments is the Coca-Cola case.197 The 
substance of the case related to practices of the company and its three major bottlers in 
supply of carbonated soft drinks, namely exclusivity requirements, growth and target 
rebates, tying and exclusivity in connection with the installation of technical sales 
equipment. The commitments offered and subsequently made binding by Commission´s 
decision provided that Coca-Cola will remove all exclusivity arrangements, rebates and 
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stop tying the most popular drinks it produces with less popular ones. Additionally, the 
company committed to leave at least 20% of space for soft drinks produced by its 
competitors in the coolers it had supplied free of charge with the soft drinks. These 
commitments became binding on the company while covering the whole area of EEA. 
However, although the practices were investigated by the Commission and the Spanish 
Competition Office198 in a number of member states, they did not cover the whole area 
of EEA. Moreover, the Commission reached a conclusion about the dominance of the 
company only in relation to relevant markets, which were identified as national.199 Some 
commentators have noted that the decision went also beyond the scope of the relevant 
product market.200 
Commitments going beyond the product and geographical scope of the relevant market 
which was investigated would most certainly be considered as disproportionate if this 
principle would apply to the commitment decisions in the same manner as it does to 
remedies in prohibition decisions. Based on the CJEU´s ruling in Alrosa, the Commission 
may legally extract commitments going beyond the initially investigated product and 
geographical markets, provided that the undertaking offers such concessions. That, in 
turn, enhances the effectiveness of commitment decisions in terms of time-saving, as the 
Commission does not need to investigate the practices of the company in every single 
market, but also of the commitments made binding, because they secure that company´s 
conduct will not contravene competition rules in other markets, despite not being formally 
investigated.  
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5.4.4 Commitment decisions in the energy sector  
The energy sector represents the area in which the Commission made an extensive use of 
commitment decisions since Regulation 1/2003. In this period, the Commission has 
adopted a total of 18 decisions in this sector, 12 of which were commitment decisions. 
That means that 1/3 of all commitment decisions were adopted in this particular sector. 
Being a preferable way of dealing with antitrust cases, this section will explore the reasons 
for the popularity of commitment decisions in this sector. 
i. Characteristics of the energy sector 
Energy markets in the EU were characteristic for their substantial degree of vertical 
integration with a single state-owned entity being active on every level of the market. 
Although some of these levels, like distribution, encompass natural monopolies, some 
activities are potentially competitive, as long as the undertakings have an access to the 
incumbent’s infrastructure.201 The Commission launched a sector inquiry pursuant to 
Article 17 of Regulation 1/2003 in June 2005 in response to sudden increases in gas and 
electricity wholesale prices and high barriers to entry, which suggested that the market, 
in fact, stays closed to competition, even after measures leading to liberalisation of the 
sectors were made on the EU-wide level.202 The inquiry revealed that the gas and 
electricity markets remain highly concentrated, the networks are insufficiently unbundled 
and the competition at the retail level is often limited due to the long term contracts with 
the customers. Moreover, the incumbents exceptionally enter markets in the other 
Member States. Based on the inquiry, the Commission proposed addressing these issues 
by a regulation.203 The subsequent political outcry resulted in a compromise and two 
corresponding Directives204. The Commission thus failed to address the unsatisfactory 
competition on the market by regulatory means. In turn, the Commission chose to resolve 
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these issues through competition enforcement and initiated an antitrust investigation into 
practices of energy incumbents in the several Member States with the aim of 
supplementing the regulatory approach in the liberalisation of energy markets. 
Commitment decisions in these cases served as an effective way to achieve the desired 
effects by reaching deals with energy incumbents.205  
ii. Long- term contracts – the Distrigaz case  
Some of the cases in the energy sector involved long-term supply contracts in the 
upstream natural gas sector.206 According to the Commission, these contracts have an 
effect of locking in the customers to a particular producer for over the defined period of 
time. The Commission considers that such contracts amount to infringements of Article 
102 TFEU as they involve significant efficiency losses, harm consumers and foreclose 
the market.207 In the Distrigaz case, the Commission raised concerns about long-term 
supply contracts of the Belgian incumbent with customers, which required them to 
purchase certain volumes of gas over a specified period of time exclusively from this 
company. It follows that these contracts made it very difficult for alternative suppliers to 
compete on the market. To address these concerns Distrigaz offered behavioural 
commitments, which provided that the company will put 35% of its volumes sold to large 
industrial purchasers on the market and to limit the duration of supply contracts with large 
industrial customers to a maximum of 5 years, granted unilateral termination rights to 
other customers and removed tacit renewal clauses. The Commission further sought to 
provide guidance on factors it will consider illegal in long-term contracts208, rather than 
stating a fixed maximum length of these contracts.209 The second case addressing 
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foreclosure of the market by long-term contracts was the Long term electricity contracts 
in France case210 where the Commission applied the above-mentioned test from the 
Distrigaz case in order to assess the legality of contracts between EDF and large industrial 
customers. As a result, EDF undertook to let its customers to opt-out of contracts and 
remove the resell restrictions.   
iii. Access to transportation network: RWE, CEZ and ENI cases 
Another focus of Commitment enforcement activities aimed at market foreclosures 
stemming from restrictions on access to transportation networks. In the RWE211, CEZ212 
and ENI213 cases, the Commission took the view that these companies had abused their 
dominant positions by inter-alia refusing access to their gas and electricity networks. This 
so-called capacity hoarding, involves dominant company reserving transport capacities 
on the network for itself, thus constituting a special type of refusal to supply.214 Moreover, 
according to Commission’s preliminary assessment, RWE had set its transmission tariffs 
too high, so the competitors were not able to gain profits, thus amounting to the practice 
of margin squeeze. To address these concerns RWE, ENI and ČEZ offered structural 
commitments. Structural commitments aimed to ensure that these companies will not 
engage in anti-competitive practices relating to access to their networks.215 These 
commitments involved RWE´s divestiture of its gas transmission network to a suitable 
purchaser, commitment of ENI to divest its shareholdings in companies related to 
international gas transmission pipelines and transmission operators and gas transmission 
systems in the other Member States.216 CEZ undertook to divest one power plant, which 
secures entry of a new competitor on the market. 
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iv. Long-term capacity booking: the GDF and E.ON Gas cases 
The third group of cases relates to practices by which companies reject requests from 
competitors seeking capacity in the network by asserting that there is no gas import 
capacity left due to their own booking. In contrast with capacity hoarding, in long-term 
capacity booking the companies actually use the capacities.217 In the GDF218 and E.ON 
Gas219 cases the Commission accepted commitments to make 50% of the capacities 
available for competitors, thus removing bottlenecks at the entry point into gas networks 
and putting an end to the long-term foreclosure of access to gas import capacities.220  
According to Commission´s preliminary assessment in the German Electricity Wholesale 
Market case221 the Commission assessed conduct of E.ON on the wholesale electricity 
market as an abuse of the company’s dominant position. The Article 102 might have been 
infringed by E.ON increasing its own costs on the upstream market in order to favour its 
vertically integrated affiliate on the downstream market and thus passing on the costs on 
consumers and by preventing competitors in entering the market.222 To address these 
competition concerns the commitments provided for divestiture of about one-fifth of 
company´s electricity generation capacity in Germany and the whole electricity 
transmission network.223 The Commission concluded that divestitures will safeguard that 
the alleged abuse will not be repeated.224 
v. Commitment decisions in the energy sector: Conclusion 
The energy sector represents an area in which the Commission made an extensive use of 
commitment decisions, with only three cases concluded by a prohibition decision, two of 
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which concerned market sharing practices225 and the decision in the OPCOM case226 in 
which the Commission imposed a fine on Romanian power exchange operator for abusing 
its dominant position by refusing to accept traders from different Member States. Taking 
into account the above-mentioned recent developments in the Gazprom case, this trend is 
likely to continue. Commitment decisions in this particular sector all had one thing in 
common – they were used to supplement the EU-wide objective of liberalisation of energy 
markets. In this way, the commitment procedure served as a “quasi-regulatory” 
mechanism to foster the liberalisation.227 Commitment procedure enabled the 
Commission to negotiate on possible solutions of (in most of the cases) lack of 
competition on the market. In cases resolved by adopting behavioural commitments the 
Commission provided guidance as to what conduct might be regarded as anticompetitive, 
particularly with regard to long-term contracts and on the wholesale level of the market 
or capacity bookings by incumbents and restricting access to incumbent’s infrastructure, 
thus targeting novel issues arising in connection with the liberalisation of these markets. 
On 26 July 2016 adopted decision by which the Commission released E.ON from its 
commitments to reduce long-term bookings on the German gas transmission grid 5 years 
prior to the original termination date provided for in the final decision. That has to be 
viewed as a successful opening of the market to competition.228  
The most prominent example of the quasi-regulatory use of commitment decisions are 
the structural commitments, by virtue of which the Commission actively reshaped the 
markets according to its own competition and regulatory objectives.229 The Commission 
has thus achieved market outcomes which are more usually achieved via sector-specific 
regulation.230 These commitments served the Commission in effectively opening up 
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energy markets to the Competition as they ensured that alleged abuses of dominant 
position cannot be repeated in the future, thus bringing the antitrust enforcement closer 
to Commission´s future-oriented assessment in merger cases.231 Moreover, structural 
commitments provide for swift implementation and no need for further monitoring, in 
this sense than being more effective than behavioural commitments requiring monitoring, 
burdening both the enforcer and the company. 
However, the extended use of commitments and mainly of structural commitments in the 
energy sector raises some important issues. Firstly, the practice of addressing 
imperfections of the liberalisation by competition enforcement rather than by regulation 
based on the political decision-making, thus effectively bypassing the usual way of 
resolving these issues is questionable as to the legitimacy of this approach. Moreover, as 
Commission´s antitrust concerns are based merely on its preliminary views, some cases 
might be based on rather controversial merits and un-tested theories of harm.232 
Nevertheless, the Commission´s position in establishing harm in energy cases was 
facilitated by the clear dominant position of the incumbents and plenty of information 
gathered from the sector inquiry and from national energy regulators.233  
The fact remains that the Commission enjoys a wide margin of discretion while accepting 
commitments. It´s decisions are free from judicial review of the appropriateness and 
proportionality of the commitments which alleviates the pressure on the Commission to 
build a solid case. Furthermore, Commission’s position in the process of negotiating 
commitments with companies being investigated is strengthened by the threat of 
substantial fines, so they may offer far-reaching commitments going beyond merely 
addressing antitrust concerns. Even though the Commission reasoned it´s use of structural 
commitments by the inadequacy of any behavioural alternatives, it remains questionable 
given the fact that structural remedies have never been imposed as a remedy in a 
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prohibition decision. It is thus up to Commission´s self-restraint in the application of 
commitment decision and devising commitments which are appropriate to address its 
competition issues.  
5.4.5 Commitment decisions in fast-moving sectors   
According to the Europe 2020 strategy, information and communication technologies and 
other sectors of the fast-moving digital economy are “important drivers of productivity, 
innovation and growth in all sectors of the economy”234. The sectors of the digital 
economy are characteristic for their rapid innovations, network effects and “winner takes 
all” competitive forces creating dominant positions of successful companies, although in 
some cases only temporarily.235 The network effects of these industries enable the 
dominant to lock-in customers and continue strengthening its position.236 As already 
mentioned in the previous chapter concerning quickness of the commitment procedure, 
these markets seem particularly opt for the use of commitment decisions, because of the 
necessity to quickly address potential competition restrictions. However, the Commission 
must be cautious because if the assessment of the potentially anticompetitive conduct is 
incorrect, it may lead to over enforcement and a potential impediment to the competition 
on the market and future innovation.  
Being one of the key drivers of the modern economy, the Commission has been 
investigating a number of practices concerning digital markets. However, contrary to the 
presumptions of their usefulness in the fast-moving sectors, commitment decisions have 
not been used to the extent expected by some.237 The decisional practice of the 
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Commission in this sector includes the above-mentioned cases IBM, Rambus, Microsoft 
and Samsung.  
The eBooks case238 also falls within the group of decisions from the digital sector. This 
case had in fact 2 stages in which commitments were accepted from various parties. The 
first commitment decision made legally binding commitments from Apple and four 
international publishers. These companies had suddenly switched from wholesale 
contracts to agency contracts, which provided for maximum retail prices, restrictions on 
price setting of retailers and flat 30% commission for Apple. The Commission had a 
suspicion of coordination between Apple and the publishers, which aimed at raising retail 
prices for eBooks. The parties committed to terminate existing contracts and amending 
their behaviour towards retailers. Apple´s commitments include termination of the 
agreements and not enforcing problematic clauses in the existing agreements. The second 
decision in this case, adopted 7 months after the first one, included fifth publisher 
Penguin, by whom the Commission accepted commitments which are substantially the 
same as those in the former decision, with only minor differences in the behaviour 
towards retailers. The decision in the eBooks case showed two interesting features. 
Firstly, it demonstrated that in the commitment procedure concerning agreements 
between undertakings, the Commission is flexible in reaching a settlement with some of 
the undertakings earlier than with others, thus effectively enabling these commitments to 
be implemented earlier, if the negotiations with the last undertaking does not go as 
smoothly as with the others. Secondly, this case shows that the quick impact on the market 
was of a main importance – the Commission adopted the commitment decision only one 
year after the initiation of formal proceedings, despite the commitments, in fact, 
amounting to cease and desist order.  
Recently, the Commission issued a final report from a sector inquiry into the e-commerce 
sector, initiated in 2015. Subsequently, it opened a number of proceedings239 with 
undertakings active on that particular market, such was the case with the inquiry into the 
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energy sector. The newly opened investigations target mainly geo-blocking practices, but 
also more traditional practices such as resale price maintenance.240 It remains to be seen 
whether the Commission will make use of commitment decisions to resolve antitrust 
issues or rather by a standard way of prohibition decisions. 
5.5 Effectiveness of commitments: Conclusion 
The objective of this chapter was to analyse various features of commitments, which 
positively contribute to their effectiveness. It was observed that the Commission benefits 
from the limited application of the principle of proportionality on the commitment 
decisions. Judgement of the CJEU in the Alrosa case enabled the Commission to 
effectively deal with cases by accepting commitments. Not being constrained by what it 
could impose in a prohibition decision, the Commission may use commitment decisions 
to flexibly tackle various forms of possibly anticompetitive conduct.  
Commitment decisions also allow for a better tailoring of commitments as they are 
offered by the company itself and further market tested by third parties. On the contrary, 
remedies imposed unilaterally by the Commission have proven to entail various 
deficiencies as to their effectivity. Furthermore, commitments also provide for easier 
implementation, as the company certainly assesses the difficulty of the implementation 
of commitments prior to offering them to the Commission.  
Analysis of the decisional practice showed that the Commission has accepted 
commitments in many different sectors while targeting various practices which raised its 
competition concerns. At the outset, commitment decisions served as a continuation of 
the notification regime as it allowed the companies to amend their agreements to be in 
line with Article 101 of the TFEU. In the Coca-Cola case, the Commission made use of 
its discretion while accepting commitments to extend the commitments to markets and 
products, which were not initially subject to the investigation. It was observed that the 
Commission made use of commitment decisions in the energy sector to supplement the 
wider EU objective of liberalisation of these markets. Although the practice raised 
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concerns as to its legitimacy, the Commission succeeded to obtain structural remedies 
from some of the companies, which should ensure that the potentially abusive conduct 
cannot be repeated in the future.  
Based on the foregoing considerations, it must be concluded that commitments are in 
many cases better suited to resolve Commission´s antitrust issues. They can certainly be 
more flexible than remedies imposed in prohibition decisions and the company is more 
likely to implement them easily and comply with them. They have proven to be an 
effective tool in various different circumstances. However, the Commission should 
carefully assess the proposed commitments in order to ensure they can bring the desired 
effect on the market. 
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6. COMMITMENT DECISIONS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGAL 
CERTAINTY 
The objective of previous chapters of this thesis was to explore various features of 
commitment decisions, which contribute to their effectiveness. As it was explored above 
in this thesis, based on the to-date practice of the Commission, commitment decisions 
have proved to be an effective tool in resolving various types of possibly anticompetitive 
conduct. But the extensive use of this antitrust enforcement tool has raised many 
important questions among professionals and scholars concerning downsides and risks 
which commitment decisions encompass. These drawbacks include mainly due process 
considerations, detrimental effects on private enforcement of competition law and a lack 
of transparency. Most notably, commitment decisions do not have the same effects as 
prohibition decisions, in terms of both individual and general deterrence, punishment and 
discharging gains from the illegal conduct. Perhaps the most criticism is aimed at the 
limited precedential value of commitment decisions. Given the attractiveness of 
commitment decisions for the Commission and for the parties to the proceedings, it is 
necessary for the Commission to carefully evaluate the pros and cons of each type of 
decision on a case-by-case basis. 
One of the most important limitations of the use of commitment decisions should be the 
principle of legal certainty. This chapter will analyse what impact commitment decisions 
have on legal certainty of the undertakings active on the market and suggests the optimal 
balance between the effective use of commitment decisions and the legal certainty.  
The principle of legal certainty, being a general principle of EU law, requires inter alia 
that rules, which lead to negative consequences for individuals, to be clear, precise and 
predictable.241 It is widely perceived that when the antitrust enforcer is deciding what type 
of procedure shall be used to intervene in markets, one of the most important 
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considerations is the degree of legal certainty.242 Legal certainty represents the awareness 
of the undertakings of how a particular conduct will be perceived by the authorities. In 
addition, the bodies enforcing competition law have a responsibility to adopt decisions 
that should not be revoked by the courts to ensure predictable and effective competition 
law regime.243  
Prohibition decisions adopted by the Commission authoritatively establish that behaviour 
of the undertaking constitutes an infringement of EU competition rules. These decisions 
provide a greater detail of Commission´s assessment of a particular conduct and an 
exhaustive theory of harm, thus giving valuable guidance to other companies on the 
market.244 Prohibition decisions are usually subject to judicial review by the EU courts, 
which can further contribute to clarifying the law and to its development. Once confirmed 
by the court, prohibition decisions create a solid legal precedent with a strong deterrent 
effect.  
Conversely, by virtue of a commitment decision the Commission does not establish an 
infringement of EU competition rules, it merely concludes that there are no longer 
grounds for its action. As repeatedly noted above, commitment decisions are not based 
on a full investigation into the facts of the case and as such they do not necessarily have 
to meet the same standard of evidence as prohibition decisions do. The decision does not 
represent a definite conclusion on the application of law to the facts of the case. The 
reasoning of the Commission and the legal and factual assessment of undertaking´s 
conduct is more concise in comparison to necessarily profound reasoning in prohibition 
decisions. Finally, commitment decisions are very rarely subject to subsequent judicial 
review and based on the Alrosa judgement the scope of judicial review is limited, so 
Commissions assessments of novel and untested theories of harm and evidence behind 
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them escape the scrutiny of EU courts.245 The numbers prove this assumption, apart from 
Alrosa, there has been only one direct challenge of commitment decisions, which was 
unsuccessful.246  
6.1 Novel theories of harm and unclear legal issues in commitment decisions  
The Commission acknowledges the lower precedential value of commitment decisions 
and proclaims favouring prohibition decisions in cases, which call for establishing an 
important precedent.247 Although this may suggest that the Commission will not use 
commitment procedure in cases where the law is unclear or the theory of harm is untested, 
the opposite is true.  
The Commission has put forward novel theories of harm on several occasions in its 
commitment decisions. In the Rambus case248, the Commission introduced a novel 
concept of “patent ambush”. The Commission alleged that the company abused its 
dominant position by not disclosing the existence of certain patents and patent 
applications for its DRAM chips during the standard-setting process and subsequently 
charged excessively high royalties for the use of these patents. The novelty of the concept 
of “patent ambush” together with the strict test based on the judgement in the United 
Brands case249 to establish that prices are excessive with only a few instances where the 
concept was subject to judicial review and the fact that even the Commission admitted 
the “complexness and difficult nature of the case”250 beg a question whether the 
Commission´s assessment of unlawfulness of company´s behaviour would be upheld in 
court. Moreover, the abuse in form of excessive prices was seen by the Commission in 
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the Standard & Poor´s case251, for company´s prices for the supply of identification 
numbers of securities.  
The Commission´s willingness to tackle novel issues where the law is not so clear is also 
apparent from the commitment decisions adopted in cases in the energy sector. Most 
notably, the Commission put forward a theory of harm resulting from strategic 
underinvestment in the GDF Suez case252, based on which the company limited 
investments in the development of its gas transmission terminals, which resulted in 
foreclosure of the market. This concept alters the view that Article 102 TFEU may only 
oblige the undertaking to grant access to an essential facility it owns, however not to 
expand or construct new ones in order to facilitate market entry for competitors.253  
The recently adopted decision in the Container shipping case254 serves as another 
illustration of closing a case by commitments in an area where the law is rather unclear. 
The case concerned a practice of 14 container shipping companies and their 
announcements of future price increases. The Commission had concerns that this practice 
of announcing price changes allowed for coordination of shippers´ behaviour. However, 
as some commentators noted255, the Commission did not put forward evidence of 
concerted practices between the companies and did not consider whether the price 
signalling was capable of harming competition in line with CJEU´s judgements in the 
Wood Pulp256 and T-Mobile Netherlands257 cases. 
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6.2 Guidance for future cases  
Some commitment decisions should serve as a “model for addressing similar situation” 
according to the Commission.258 The above-mentioned decisions from energy sector 
concerning long-term contracts are one illustration of such approach. Mainly the 
Distrigaz decision is regarded as a guidance on the compliance of these agreements with 
EU competition rules.259 Another case serving as a guidance in the Commission´s opinion 
is the Ship Classification case260, which concerned assessment of standardisation 
agreements.261 The Commission subsequently included some information gathered 
during the investigation and its assessment of standardisation agreements in its Horizontal 
Guidelines.262  
The last example, which the Commission deems to provide guidance to companies,263  is 
the Siemens/Areva case264, in which the Commission assessed the scope and duration of 
a non-compete obligation related to a joint venture of the companies. According to the 
shareholder agreement, the non-compete should continue for a period of 8 – 11 years after 
Siemens loses control over the joint venture. The Commission reached a preliminary 
conclusion that these closes were only “partially ancillary” to the acquisition of sole 
control over the joint venture.265 The Commission thus concluded that the non-compete 
obligation can be regarded as ancillary to the concentration only in relation to specified 
number of products and limited to the duration of 3 years.266  
                                                 
258 Commission Staff Working Document, ‘Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003‘, 
op. cit. 239, para. 109 
259 Ibid, see also, to that end, TALUS, K., ´Long-term natural gas contracts and antitrust law in the European 
Union and the United States´, op. cit. 209, p. 270. 
260 Case COMP/39.416 Ship classification.  
261 See 10 years of Regulation 1/2003, Staff document, para. 31., see also Guidelines on the applicability 
of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation 
agreements, 2011/C 11/01, para. 257.  
262 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements, OJ C 11, 14.1.2011, para. 
295. 
263 European Commission, Competition Policy Brief, op. cit. 101, p. 3 
264 Case COMP/39.736 Siemens/Areva, Commission Decision of 18 June 2012. 
265 Ibid., para. 32. 
266 Ibid., para. 92. 
65 
 
However, the reliance on previous commitment decisions raises an issue of their 
precedential value. The decision itself does not amount to an authoritative statement of 
whether the investigated behaviour is unlawful under EU competition law, it is 
questionable to which extent should the other undertakings rely on it. Moreover, the 
Commission´s decision is not subject to a full investigation into the facts and evidence 
and does not provide for a full assessment of the allegedly anticompetitive conduct. Even 
the Commission itself admits that commitment decisions may merely “may also provide 
guidance to companies“267, recognising their lower precedential value. The guidance 
provided by commitment decisions should thus not be taken for granted. Although other 
companies can learn from the decision “what was considered by the Commission 
sufficient to remove the competition concern”268, the decision usually does not provide a 
sufficient assessment of the anticompetitive conduct. Commitment decisions should let 
the companies active on the market know how to comply with EU competition law, rather 
than what commitments will be sufficient to remedy the conduct.  
Hence, if the Commission seeks to provide guidance in a commitment decision, it should 
provide a more throughout assessment of the particular conduct, so that other market 
players may accurately assess whether their own behaviour is in line with EU competition 
law. The final decision in the Siemens/Areva case provided a greater level of detail on 
Commission´s assessment of the no-compete clause, which enabled to get more insight 
into Commissions thinking, thus representing a good example to follow when aiming to 
provide guidance.   
6.3 Enhancing legal certainty by adopting both types of decisions – Samsung 
and Motorola cases 
In 2012 the Commission initiated two proceedings against manufacturers of mobile 
phones Samsung and Motorola concerning very similar conduct. Both companies 
undertook to licence their standard essential patents on mobile technologies on fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms and conditions in the standard-setting 
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process. However, companies failed to reach a licencing agreement with a competitor and 
sought injunctions from a court. The Commission assessed whether seeking injunctions 
can amount to an abuse of a dominant position.  
In the Motorola case,269 the Commission adopted a prohibition decision in which it 
concluded that company which undertakes to license its patents on FRAND terms abuses 
its dominant position if it seeks injunctions against a possible licensee, who is willing 
enter into an agreement on FRAND terms. The decision includes Commission´s detailed 
legal assessment of the case and conditions, which would justify Motorola´s actions.  
In the Samsung case,270 the Commission adopted a commitment decision on the same day 
as the prohibition decision in the Motorola case. In the commitments, Samsung 
introduced a mechanism, by which disputes related to standard-essential patents could be 
resolved.271 While concluding a licencing contract, the company allowed for a negotiation 
period of 12 months only after which either party can choose to go to court.  
Although the Commission did not impose a fine in the prohibition decision against 
Motorola because of the novelty of the issue272 and the company did not appeal the 
decision to the General Court, the combination of both types of the decision to deal with 
a novel issue is welcomed. The Commission has carried the necessary in-depth 
assessment of the practice in the Motorola decision while applying the same reasoning in 
the Samsung decision. As a result, the Commission saved time and commitments made 
binding on Samsung (although not binding for other companies) showed a compliant way 
of dealing with licencing disputes in the future.    
6.4 Commitments and the principle of legal certainty: Conclusion 
It is undeniable that while commitment decisions can grant legal certainty to the 
undertakings concerned at the point the commitment decision is adopted.  However, in 
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terms of the principle of legal certainty in a meaning of a legal “road map” for other 
market participants, as defined at the beginning of this chapter, the commitment decisions 
provide considerably less guidance for the companies to assess their behaviour. 
Some commentators have suggested that commitment decisions should be used only in 
cases of clear-cut infringements.  In such cases, the Commission could benefit from the 
streamlined commitment procedure and save time and resources. However, in the 
author´s opinion, if the infringement is clear-cut then the Commission should be able to 
issue an infringement decision with more ease. Also punishing the company for infringing 
rules which are clear enough and thus motivate the other market participants to act in 
compliance with EU competition law might be more desirable than accepting 
commitments to alter its behaviour in the future. Moreover, the company might have to 
offer more onerous commitments in order to satisfy the Commission when the law is 
clear.  
Schweitzer notes that the Commission might incline to use commitments to address 
potential infringements of Article 101 or 102 of the TFEU where the law is unclear.  In 
such cases, commitment decisions facilitate the position of the Commission as they 
merely react to competition concerns, so the Commission does not have to prove the 
conduct was illegal to the required legal standard. The practice of the Commission shows 
that in some cases the Commission did opt for commitments where the law was unclear. 
Wagner-von Papp warns that this practice might lead to a “vicious circle”, where the use 
of commitment decisions in cases where the law is unclear will to even greater demand 
for commitment decisions and accordingly the legal certainty will decrease.   
Based on the foregoing consideration it must be concluded that striking the right balance 
between the effective use of commitment decisions and the principle of legal certainty 
presents a difficult task. In cases of clear-cut infringements, the Commission can certainly 
benefit from the faster procedure and easily resolve the case, but it should consider 
whether the punishment of behaviour which clearly infringes the law is not more 
appropriate. If the Commission adopts a commitment decision but wants to set a guidance 
for the other market participants, it should include a more throughout assessment of the 
potentially unlawful conduct in its decisions. This is especially true in cases where the 
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Commission adopted a statement of objections instead of a preliminary assessment. In 
cases of novel theories of harm or where the law is not so clear, the approach in the 
Motorola and Samsung cases discussed above seems preferable. Prohibition decision with 
more precedential value contains a detailed assessment while the commitments might 
provide for an effective example of compliant measures. In other cases, the Commission 
should carefully weigh the potential outcomes of both types of decisions. Having a wide 
margin of discretion in dealing with cases it is up to the Commission´s self-restraint to 
conclude cases appropriately as practices concerning novel and complex theories may 
result in either result in clear breaches, but others may require more explanation and 
proof.  In these cases, the Commission risks over-enforcement by accepting commitments 
to address a potentially unlawful conduct, which may prove to be harmless while assessed 
thoroughly and thus potentially impede future development of the market.  
It should also be borne in mind that in cases of novel theories of harm or where it is 
unclear how the law applies to a particular practice, the use of commitment decisions does 
not mean that Commission´s theories are shielded from the judicial scrutiny of the EU 
courts. That might be provided by the reference for a preliminary ruling, such was the 
case of Huawei Technologies273, where the CJEU had the chance to consider 
Commission´s arguments from the above-mentioned Samsung and Motorola cases. 
Although it will certainly not happen in every case, this example shows how the courts 
can de-facto review Commission´s decision, albeit not in course of challenge of a 
commitment decision. It is however quite probable that the CJEU will be approached in 
other cases which dealt with novel issues, which will present a chance clarify the law for 
the future.  
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7. CONCLUSION  
The objective of this thesis was to evaluate the practice of adopting commitment 
decisions. The evaluation was based on two aspects, which are deemed as the most 
important by the author – the effectiveness and the principle of legal certainty. The 
effectiveness of commitment decisions was split into two interrelated dimensions - the 
commitment procedure and the commitments, which the Commission´s decision makes 
binding on the undertaking. The principle of legal certainty was put forward as a principle 
which should limit the Commission while choosing the optimal way to deal with 
competition issues.   
The first chapter explained the most fundamental changes to the enforcement of 
competition law brought by Regulation 1/2003 which are relevant to the topic of this 
thesis. The second chapter provided an introduction to commitment decisions and 
outlined the legal framework under which these decisions may be adopted. The 
fundamental features of this type of decisions were explored in order to lay down the 
necessary background for the subsequent analysis in the following chapters.  In chapter 
three, the author explained how the modernisation of the EU competition law turned the 
focus of antitrust enforcement in the EU towards effectiveness. It was observed that the 
effectiveness permeates through all dimensions of the modernisation.  
In the fourth chapter, the author focused on the effectiveness of the commitment 
procedure. It was firstly explained that the effectiveness of the procedure is inherently 
associated with its swiftness. The analysis concentrated on the rules on the commitment 
procedure. It was observed that these rules should enable the Commission to resolve cases 
rapidly. There are several aspects of the procedure which contribute to its quickness, 
mainly less formalised process without an adversarial part, which is inherent to the 
infringement procedure. However, several shortcomings of the procedure, which have a 
negative impact on its quickness, were identified. The author argued that the possibility 
to adopt a decision even after a statement of objection has been issued diminishes the time 
savings of the whole procedure. The analysis of the decisional practice of the Commission 
has shown that the commitment procedure is in general quicker, although there have been 
occasions where the Commission sought to accept commitments and the procedure took 
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considerably longer. On the other hand, in cases where the parties approached the 
Commission at an early stage of the proceedings the commitment procedure provides for 
a swift adoption of a decision. The analysis also confirmed the argument that issuing a 
statement of objections prolongs the procedure by showing that in these cases the 
procedure is considerably longer. In terms of quickness, the author therefore suggests 
abolishing this practice. Commission enjoys a wide discretion in terms of whether it will 
accept commitments from the parties to the proceedings and it may choose to terminate 
negotiations on the possible commitments and continue towards a prohibition decision at 
any point. Hence, the Commission should switch to the prohibition path when the 
negotiations take too long, which also signals that it is difficult to formulate the 
commitments. 
The fifth chapter focused on the effectiveness of commitments. It was argued that 
commitments must be effective to make the desired impact on the market. The author 
regarded the limited application of the principle of proportionality as the main aspect 
contributing to the effectiveness of commitments. The fact that the Commission is not 
obliged to compare commitments to remedies it could impose in a prohibition decision 
enables the Commission to freely accept commitments, which can be far more flexible in 
addressing its competition concerns. Furthermore, commitments are offered by the parties 
to the proceedings themselves and which allows for a better tailoring of their design and 
easier implementation after the decision is issued. Market testing then allows for a fine 
tuning of the commitments and help the Commission while assessing their 
appropriateness. Conversely, remedies imposed unilaterally by the Commission, which 
are not discussed with neither the parties to the proceedings nor other market participants, 
more easily lack the desired effect on the market.  
Analysis of Commission´s decisional practice showed that commitments have been used 
to deal with various competition issues identified by the Commission. The most 
remarkable in this regard is the extensive use of commitment decisions in the energy 
sector. Commitments effectively supplemented a sector-specific regulation in the process 
of liberalisation of these markets by enabling the Commission to obtain commitments 
directly from the companies. Hence, the Commission has by-passed lack of political will 
to regulate the markets. Only in the energy sector, the Commission has been successful 
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in obtaining structural commitments which secured that the identified conduct, which 
could amount to an infringement of Article 102 of the TFEU will not be repeated in the 
future.  
The aim of the last chapter was to explore the relation between an effective use of 
commitment decisions and the principle of legal certainty. It was argued that this principle 
should serve as a main limitation for the Commission when it commitment decisions 
undoubtedly have lower precedential value than prohibition decision. It was argued that 
the Commission should abstain from issuing a decision while the case presents a novel 
theory of harm or an issue on which the law is not so unambiguous. On the other hand, a 
proposition that commitment decision should only be used in clear-cut infringements is 
not so optimal. In cases of clear-cut infringements, the law is clear enough for the 
undertakings to self-assess that their behaviour is not in compliance with EU competition 
law. The Commission should thus aim to punish the unlawful behaviour because adopting 
a commitment decision in such cases might send a wrong message that companies can 
act with impunity.  
Striking the balance between the effective use of commitment decisions and legal 
certainty thus presents a demanding task. Free from the scrutiny of the courts with blurry 
boundaries laid down in EU legislation, it is now for the Commission to show its self-
restraint when adopting commitment decisions. Excessive use of commitment decisions 
may lead to even great demand for this alternative procedure and the law might slowly 
evaporate in favour of consensual resolutions.  
The prohibition decision adopted in the Google case reminds us that the Commission is 
still courageous to put forward rather bald theories of harm against the biggest 
corporations in the world, although it initially seemed that commitments are the only way 
the case will be resolved. It remains to be seen, how the courts will respond. Moreover, 
although the lack of judicial review of commitment decision is one of the main downsides 
of this type of a decision, it does not necessarily mean that novel theory of harm will 
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never be scrutinised by the EU courts. The Huawei Technologies case274 proves that 
assumption and shows that even though only by means of a preliminary ruling, novel 
theories of harm in commitment decisions are not shielded from the scrutiny of the courts.  
  




TEZE V ČESKÉM JAZYCE 
Úvod 
Nařízení 1/2003 znamenalo začátek éry modernizace soutěžního práva v EU a dramaticky 
změnilo způsob, kterým jsou prosazována pravidla chránící hospodářskou soutěž. Jednou 
z nových pravomocí Komise je také možnost přijímat rozhodnutí, kterým učiní právně 
závaznými závazky navržené ze strany podniků vyšetřovaných pro porušení článku 101 
nebo 102 Smlouvy o fungování Evropské Unie (dále jen „SFEU“). Účelem rozhodnutí o 
závazcích je rychle a flexibilně reagovat na podezření Komise z porušení pravidel na 
ochranu hospodářské soutěže. Toto rozhodnutí tedy představuje alternativu pro 
standardní rozhodnutí podle článku 7 Nařízení 1/2003, kterým Komise autoritativně 
rozhoduje o tom, aby dotyčné podniky takové jednání ukončili.  
Práce se zaměřuje na zhodnocení praxe přijímání rozhodnutí o závazcích na základě dvou 
základních kritérií – efektivity a právní jistoty. Prvním cílem práce je definovat a zjistit 
limity efektivity rozhodnutí o závazcích, neboť právě efektivita je považovaná za hlavní 
přínos tohoto nástroje. Efektivita se v souvislosti s tímto typem rozhodnutí dle autora 
vztahuje ke dvěma jeho vzájemně propojeným součástem – procesu přijímání rozhodnutí 
a samotným závazkům, které jsou v rámci řízení nabízeny podniky podezřelými 
z protisoutěžního jednání. Cílem procesu přijímání rozhodnutí o závazcích je co 
nejrychlejší náprava dopadů jednání, které mohlo narušující soutěž trhu a tím i úspora 
prostředků Komise, které mohou být soustředěny na jiné případy. Z toho plyne, že pokud 
má být tento institut efektivní, musí být rozhodnutí o závazcích přijato v dostatečně 
krátkém čase, ideálně dříve, než by došlo k vydání standartního rozhodnutí. Tato práce 
proto analyzuje rychlost přijímání rozhodnutí o závazcích a upozorňuje na nedostatky, 
které mohou přijetí finálního rozhodnutí zpomalit. Dále je efektivita závazků analyzována 
v souvislosti s jejími dopady na trh, jsou proto zkoumány důvody, pro které může být pro 
Komisi v určitém případě efektivnější přijmout závazky nežli pouze konstatovat porušení 
soutěžních pravidel a zakázat takové jednání do budoucna. Dalším cílem práce je zjistit, 
jak by mělo přijímání rozhodnutí o závazcích omezováno principem právní jistoty.  
Práce je rozdělena do 6 kapitol. První kapitola představuje hlavní změny, které přineslo 
Nařízení 1/2003. Druhá kapitola nejprve nastiňuje praxi neformálního přijímání závazků 
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za účinnosti Nařízení 17/62, následuje vysvětlením základních pravidel, na základě 
kterých Komise vydává rozhodnutí o závazcích. Kapitola třetí se zabývá otázkou 
efektivity a prosazování soutěžního práva v EU pomocí rozhodnutí o závazcích. 
V kapitole čtvrté autor zkoumá proces přijímání rozhodnutí a jeho efektivita. Kapitola 
pátá je zaměřena na analýzu efektivity závazků přijímaných Komisí. Kapitola šestá 
diskutuje dopady přijímání rozhodnutí o závazcích na právní jistotu. Závěr práce je 
věnován shrnutí zjištěných poznatků a jejich zhodnocení.  
Nařízení 1/2003 
Úkolem Nařízení 1/2003 bylo reformovat provádění pravidel na ochranu hospodářské 
soutěže nahrazením prvního prováděcího Nařízení 17/62, aby mohla být tato pravidla 
efektivně prosazována i po rozšíření Unie o nové členské státy. Jednou z největších 
změnou, kterou Nařízení přineslo, je nahrazení notifikace dohod mezi podniky a 
pravomoci Komise udělovat výjimky podle článku 101(3) SFEU přímou aplikací této 
výjimky. Navíc došlo k decentralizaci aplikace článků 101 a 102 SFEU, kdy začaly tyto 
články nově aplikovat i členské státy, resp. Jejich soutěžní úřady a soudy. Za účelem 
konsistentní aplikace byl vytvořen European Competition Network. 
Nařízení také zesílilo vyšetřovací pravomoci Komise a explicitně reguluje důkazní 
břemeno. Dále Nařízení specifikovalo oprávnění Komise ukládat v rámci rozhodnutí 
podle článku 7 nápravná opatření, která jsou přiměřená k protiprávnímu jednání a 
nezbytná k jeho efektivnímu ukončení. Tato nápravná opatření mohou se mohou týkat 
tržního jednání podniku, nebo mohou být strukturální. Strukturální opatření lze ale 
ukládat jen pokud je to přiměřené vzhledem k protiprávnímu jednání. Tím je značně 
omezena možnost Komise ukládat strukturální nápravná opatření, což je prokázáno i tím, 
že doposud Komise v rámci rozhodnutí podle článku 7 takové opatření neuložila.  
Centralizovaný notifikační režim článku 101(3) SFEU měl za následek zahlcení Komise 
dohodami, které většinou obsahovaly pouze méně závažné porušení soutěžních pravidel. 
Nařízení 1/2003 tedy umožnilo Komisi soustředit více času a prostředků k potírání 
nejzávažnějších porušení článků 101 a 102 SFEU.  
Rozhodnutí o závazcích  
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Nařízení 1/2003 stanovilo právní rámec pro přijímání závazků od podniků ze strany 
Komise. Nicméně i za účinnosti Nařízení 17/62 Komise neformálně přijímala závazky ze 
strany podniků výměnou za uzavření daného případu. Tato praxe měla ale závažné 
nedostatky. Procedura tohoto neformálního postupu byla netransparentní, chyběla jasná 
kritéria, podle kterých se Komise rozhodovala, zda závazky příjme, navíc Komise neměla 
možnost efektivně dohlížet na dodržování takových závazků a v případě jejich porušení 
jí nezbývalo než případ znovu otevřít a pokračovat v řízení. 
Tyto nedostatky byly odstraněny Nařízením 1/2003, které na základě článku 9 umožňuje 
Komisi přijmout v průběhu řízení závazky nabídnuté ze strany podniků, proti kterým 
zamýšlela přijmout rozhodnutí podle článku 7. Podmínkou pro přijetí závazků je, že musí 
reagovat na výhrady Komise, ke kterým dospěla v rámci předběžného posouzení případu. 
Komise má možnost tyto závazky přijmout a rozhodnutím je učinit právně závaznými, 
aniž by bylo z její strany konstatováno, že došlo k porušení článku 101 nebo 102 SFEU. 
Komise nemůže přijmout závazky v případech, kde povaha protiprávního jednání 
vyžaduje uložení pokuty, tedy v případech tzv. tvrdých kartelů. V ostatních případech je 
ale v plné diskreci Komise, zda se rozhodne závazky přijme. Závazky mohou být časově 
omezeny, zároveň je může Komise kdykoliv přezkoumat a rozhodnout, že již nejsou 
třeba. Porušení závazků může Komise sankcionovat uložením pokuty ve stejné výši, jako 
v rozhodnutí podle článku 7 Nařízení 1/2003, tedy do výše 10% celkového obratu 
podniku za předcházející hospodářský rok. V případě porušení závazků, stejně jako 
v případě změny okolností, na základě kterých Komise přijala rozhodnutí, nebo pokud 
podniky poskytly Komisi nesprávně informace, může Komise znovu zahájit řízení. 
Nařízení 1/2003 a efektivita  
Modernizace soutěžního práva EU se promítla do všech jeho oblastí. Zahrnuje změnu 
orientace z formy určitého jednání směrem k jeho efektu, ale také institucionální 
modernizaci, která je reprezentována decentralizací aplikace soutěžních pravidel a zřízení 
sítě soutěžních úřadů ECN. Procedurální modernizace se promítá v postupnému odklonu 
od standardních forem vymáhání pravidel soutěžního práva k alternativním procedurám, 
zahrnujících vyjednávání s Komisí, jako jsou procedura přijímání závazků, narovnání a 
leniency program. Popularitu těchto alternativ podporují vysoké pokuty ukládané Komisí, 
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kterým se chtějí společnosti vyhnout. Z pohledu Komise znamenala modernizace 
prioritizaci efektivity v řešení soutěžních problémů na trhu. V praxi by proto vždy měla 
zvolit takové řešení, které je vzhledem k situaci nejefektivnější.  
Efektivita procedury přijímání rozhodnutí o závazcích  
Jednou z největších výhod rozhodnutí o závazcích je, že rychle reagují na obavy 
z protisoutěžního jednání vyjádřené Komisí. Rozhodnutí, které je přijaté dostatečně 
rychle, přináší požadovanou změnu na trh a zároveň šetří prostředky Komise. Rozhodnutí 
o závazcích mělo přinášet rychlejší řešení obav Komise z narušení soutěžních norem, 
nežli v případě rozhodnutí podle článku 7 Nařízení 1/2003 což bylo zdůrazněno i 
Soudním Dvorem Evropské Unie (dále jen „SDEU“) v rozhodnutí Alrosa. Autor této 
práce považuje rychlost přijetí rozhodnutí jakožto hlavní aspekt, díky kterému může být 
takové rozhodnutí efektivní.  
Přijetí rozhodnutí o závazcích ve kratším časovém úseku je umožněno díky méně 
formálnímu řízení, které zahrnuje méně procesních kroků. Obavy Komise jsou obvykle 
vyjádřeny ve formě předběžného posouzení, které by mělo sloužit jako základ pro 
formulaci závazků ze strany podniků. Nicméně v praxi diskuze o závazcích předchází 
vydání předběžného posouzení. Prohlášení o námitkách může pro účely přijetí závazků 
sloužit jako předběžné posouzení. Pokud dle Komise navržené závazky odpovídají na její 
obavy z porušení soutěžních pravidel, následuje fáze tzv. tržního testu, v kterém jsou 
přizvány zainteresované strany, aby posoudili adekvátnost závazků. Pokud na základě 
tržního testu Komise dospěje k závěru, že jsou závazky dostačující, vydá rozhodnutí, 
kterým je účinní právně závaznými.  
Ačkoliv by řízení o přijetí závazků mělo sloužit k co nejrychlejšímu přijetí finálního 
rozhodnutí, obsahuje úprava určité nedostatky, které mohou řízení prodloužit. Zejména 
se jedná o možnost Komise přijímat závazky i poté, co je podniku zasláno sdělení výhrad. 
Sdělení výhrad obsahuje detailnější posouzení daného jednání podniku nežli pouhé 
předběžné posouzení. Sdělení výhrad, které musí být vydáno vždy, když Komise zamýšlí 
vydat rozhodnutí podle článku 7 Nařízení 1/2003, musí také obsahovat informace o tom, 
zdali Komise uloží podniku pokutu, případně i nápravná opatření. Časové úspory Komise 
jsou tudíž minimalizovány, protože do doby vydání sdělení výhrad Komise postupuje 
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v řízení s cílem vydat rozhodnutí podle článku 7. Další identifikovaný nedostatek je 
v možnosti podniků zásadně upravit navržené závazky po tržním testu.  
Analýza rozhodnutí Komise přijatých mezi lety 2005 – 2016 potvrzuje, že je řízení o 
přijetí závazků podstatně kratší, nežli v případě řízení vedoucímu k rozhodnutí podle 
článku 7 Nařízení 1/2003. Průměrná délka řízení od jeho zahájení po vydání finálního 
rozhodnutí trvala v případě rozhodnutí o závazcích v průměru 31,2 měsíců, v případě 
rozhodnutí podle článku 7 to bylo 33,5 měsíců. V případě těchto rozhodnutí je třeba brát 
v potaz, že bylo řízení zahájeno až po vydání sdělení výhrad, čemuž předcházela v mnoha 
případech poměrně dlouhá doba, kdy Komise prošetřovala dané jednání bez toho, aniž by 
zahajovala řízení. Pokud tedy pro účely srovnání délky řízení použijeme jenom řízení, 
která začala dříve, nežli Komise vydala sdělení výhrad, vychází průměrná délka těchto 
řízení na 45 měsíců. Z těchto údajů lze dovozovat, že jsou rozhodnutí o závazcích 
přijímána rychleji, nežli rozhodnutí podle článku 7.  
Analýza rozhodnutí také prokázala, že výše popsané nedostatky řízení mají v praxi 
negativní efekt na rychlost přijetí finálního rozhodnutí. To platí zejména o rozhodnutí o 
závazcích, která byla vydána poté, co Komise odeslala podniku sdělení výhrad. V těchto 
případech bylo řízení o 56% delší.  
Efektivita přijatých závazků  
Základní součástí rozhodnutí o závazcích jsou závazky, které jsou nabídnuty podniky a 
rozhodnutím Komise nabývají právní závaznosti. Jelikož je cílem rozhodnutí o závazcích 
zajištění, aby byla pravidla hospodářské soutěže efektivně aplikována, je nezbytné, aby 
samotné závazky zajišťovaly efektivní řešení daného soutěžního problému. Tato kapitola 
proto analyzuje důvody, pro které je v určitých případech efektivnější využít k řešení 
výhrad Komise k určitému potenciálně protisoutěžnímu jednání právě rozhodnutí o 
závazcích, nežli rozhodnutí podle článku 7.  
 Obecně mohou být závazky buďto strukturálního charakteru, nebo se mohou týkat 
tržního chování podniku. Závazky nesmí záviset na vůli třetí strany a musí být lehce 
implementovatelné. Dohled nad dodržováním závazků může Komise vykonávat sama, 
nebo může jmenovat pro tyto účely nezávislého správce. Komise má také možnost 
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spolupracovat se sektorovými regulátory a jinými správními orgány. Na základě článku 
9 Nařízení 1/2003 mohou být závazky omezeny na dobu určitou a mohou být v průběhu 
času přezkoumány, zdali jsou nadále potřebné. Hlavním pravidlem je, že závazky musí 
odpovídat na výhrady Komise, jinak budou zamítnuty.  
Hlavní otázkou před přijetím rozhodnutí CJEU ve věci Alrosa bylo, do jaké míry se u 
závazků uplatní princip proporcionality. Nařízení 1/2003 totiž upravuje tento princip 
pouze v souvislosti s nápravnými opatřeními, které může Komise uložit spolu 
s rozhodnutím podle článku 7. Tribunál ve svém rozsudku dovodil, že princip 
proporcionality musí být aplikován na závazky podle článku 9 stejně jako na nápravná 
opatření podle článku 7, jelikož obě tato ustanovení sledují stejný cíl, kterým je efektivní 
aplikace soutěžních pravidel podle SFEU. Na základě rozsudku Tribunálu by Komise 
byla povinna v každém jednotlivém případě nabídnuté závazky poměřovat s nápravnými 
opatřeními, které by mohla uložit v rozhodnutí podle článku 7. Rozsudek Tribunálu byl 
ale zrušen na základě kasační stížnosti Komise ze strany SDEU, který dovodil, že se 
princip proporcionality v rozhodnutí závazcích neuplatní do stejné míry jako u 
zakazujících rozhodnutí a nápravných opatření. Hlavním důvodem je, že v rozhodnutí 
podle článku 7 Komise konstatuje porušení článku 101 nebo 102 SFEU, naproti tomu 
v případě rozhodnutí o závazcích pouze deklaruje, že již pominuly důvody pro její zásah. 
Princip proporcionality se tudíž v případě rozhodnutí o závazcích uplatní pouze do té 
míry, že nabídnuté závazky musí adekvátně reagovat na výhrady Komise. Z tohoto 
důvodu také soud stanovil, že přezkum rozhodnutí o závazcích je omezen pouze na 
zjištění, zdali bylo posouzení Komise zjevně nesprávné.  
Rozsudek SDEU ve věci Alrosa zajistil Komisi volnost v přijímání závazků, což ji 
umožňuje pružněji reagovat na různé typy možných protisoutěžních jednání. Efektivita 
rozhodnutí o závazcích by byla bezesporu nižší, pokud by musel být princip 
proporcionality aplikován na tento typ rozhodnutí stejně jako na nápravná opatření 
uložená v rozhodnutí, kterým Komise zakazuje určité jednání. Jak také uvedla AG 
Kokkot ve svém stanovisku ve věci Alrosa, rozhodnutí o závazcích neslouží k tomu, aby 
bylo stanoveno porušení pravidel na ochranu hospodářské soutěže, ale k tomu, aby 
závazky mohly pružně reagovat do budoucna na výhrady Komise z narušení soutěže. 
Z toho plyne, že posouzení v případě přijímání závazků musí Komise dopady závazků 
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podrobit perspektivní analýze. Rozhodovací praxe ukazuje, že Komise využila v mnoha 
případech závazků k tomu, aby zajistila lepší budoucí soutěžní podmínky, jako tomu bylo 
v případě Visa, kde byl přijat závazek omezení účtovaných mezibankovních poplatků, 
nebo případy Air France/KLM/Alitalia/Delta a Continental/United/Lufthansa/Air 
Canada, ve kterém se společnosti zavázaly, že uvolní kombinace letištních časů, aby 
umožnili dalšímu podniku vstoupit na relevantní trhy určitých transatlantických letových 
tras. 
Komise má širokou diskreci v přijímání závazků, což jí umožňuje přijímat flexibilní 
řešení jejích obav z narušení soutěže, aniž by byla povinna posuzovat, jaké nápravné 
opatření může uložit. Jelikož jsou závazky nabídnuty přímo určitým podnikem a následně 
posuzovány také ze strany dalších zainteresovaných společností, jsou lépe uzpůsobené, 
tedy i efektivní. Navíc podniky si sami vyhodnocují dopady závazků před jejich přijetím, 
což dále usnadňuje jejich implementaci. Naproti tomu nápravná opatření uložená Komisí 
často postrádají výsledného efektu na trh, jako tomu bylo v případě Microsoft.  
Analýza rozhodovací praxe Komise prokazuje, že rozhodnutí o závazcích bylo od roku 
2004 užito v mnoha různých případech k efektivnímu odstranění obav z narušení 
hospodářské soutěže. Nejprve tento typ rozhodnutí posloužil Komisi k úpravě dohod, 
které ji byly notifikovány podle Nařízení 17/62 nebo ke specifikaci podmínek pro 
uplatnění blokové výjimky. Závazky také umožňují Komisi upravit jednání podniku i na 
trzích a v souvislosti s produkty, které nebyly přímo vyšetřovány, jako tomu bylo 
v případě Coca-Cola. Nejvíce rozhodnutí o závazcích bylo přijato v energetickém 
sektoru, kde Komisi posloužily jako doplnění její snahy o liberalizaci těchto síťových 
sektorů. V tomto sektoru také Komise přijala strukturální závazky ze strany společností, 
které zajišťují, že se protisoutěžní jednání nebude opakovat v budoucnu. Tímto přístupem 
se přijímání rozhodnutí o závazcích blíží spíše regulaci, nežli ex-post vymáhání 
dodržování soutěžních pravidel. Oproti původním předpokladům nebylo v sektoru 
digitální ekonomiky přijato větší množství rozhodnutí o závazcích.  
Komise při přijímání rozhodnutí o závazcích těží zejména z toho, že má širokou diskreci 
v rozhodování, jaké závazky přijmout, a to zejména z důvodu omezeného uplatnění 
principu proporcionality. Navíc jsou závazky lépe uzpůsobené jak danému podniku, tak 
80 
 
i specifikacím daného trhu, což ještě více podporuje jejich efektivitu. Díky rozhodnutí o 
závazcích má Komise možnost flexibilně reagovat na různé případy jednání, které by 
mohlo narušovat hospodářskou soutěž. 
Rozhodnutí o závazcích a princip právní jistoty  
Předchozí kapitoly analyzovaly aspekty rozhodnutí o závazcích, které pozitivně působí 
na jejich efektivitu. Komise by ale měla při rozhodování, kterým typem rozhodnutí bude 
řešit určitý případ, brát v potaz nedostatky, které rozhodnutí o závazcích přináší. Mezi ně 
patří zejména absence preventivního účinku rozhodnutí a potrestání podniku za 
protiprávní jednání, ale také negativní dopad na postavení třetích osob. Patrně největším 
nedostatkem rozhodnutí o závazcích je jejich negativní dopad na právní jistotu pro ostatní 
účastníky hospodářské soutěže. 
Právní jistota zajišťuje, že jsou podniky schopny samy posoudit soulad svého jednání 
s pravidly na ochranu hospodářské soutěže. Komise by měla přijímat jen taková 
rozhodnutí, která nebudou zrušena soudy, aby bylo zajištěno efektivní a předvídatelný 
režim ochrany hospodářské soutěže. Zakazující rozhodnutí podle článku 7 stanovují, že 
určité jednání podniku bylo v rozporu se soutěžním právem EU. Odůvodnění rozhodnutí 
a zejména posouzení daného jednání je velmi podrobné a dává tak ostatním podnikům 
vodítko, na základě kterého lze posoudit zákonnost svého vlastního jednání na trhu. 
Naproti tomu rozhodnutí o závazcích pouze konstatují, že již není prostor pro akci 
Komise, aniž by určité jednání bylo prohlášeno za nezákonné. Jejich odůvodnění je proto 
stručnější, rozhodnutí popisují teorii újmy pouze v nedostatečném rozsahu a Komise 
nemusí dosáhnout stejného důkazního standardu. Navíc jsou rozhodnutí o závazcích 
pouze výjimečně předmětem soudního přezkumu, proto nemá soud šanci posoudit 
adekvátnost rozhodnutí Komise.  
To je spatřováno jako problematické zejména v souvislosti s případy, kde Komise 
předkládá neotestovanou teorii újmy, nebo kde není aplikace soutěžních pravidel 
dostatečně jasná. Analýza rozhodovací praxe komise ukazuje, že Komise v některých 
případech operovala s novými teoriemi újmy a přijímala závazky od podniků za praktiky, 
které postrádají konzistentní judikaturu. V jiných případech se zase Komise snažila 
případem ukázat, jak bude podobné případy posuzovat v budoucnu, což ale naráží na 
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absenci deklarace soutěžního práva. Jako ideální se jeví způsob, kterým Komise řešila 
případy Motorola a Samsung, které se oba týkaly totožné formy zneužití dominantního 
postavení. Komise v případě Motorola vydala rozhodnutí podle článku 7, ve kterém 
detailně posoudila nezákonnost jednání a popsala teorii újmy. V případě Samsung 
Komise vydala rozhodnutí o závazcích, na základě kterého společnost navrhla způsob, 
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Regulation 1/2003 empowers the European Commission to issue a decision, by which it 
makes commitments offered by the parties to the proceedings legally binding. Although 
being an alternative to the prohibition decision, it has become a predominant type of 
decision the Commission uses to tackle various antitrust issues, save from the area of 
secret cartels. This thesis primarily focuses on the effectiveness of commitment decisions, 
exploring various features contributing thereof. The first chapter outlines the main 
changes to the enforcement of EU competition law brought by Regulation 1/2003. The 
second chapter provides a necessary background for the subsequent analysis by 
introducing the legal framework for the adoption of commitment decision, followed by 
an explanation of the importance of effectiveness in public enforcement of EU 
competition law. The fourth chapter analyses effectiveness of the commitment procedure, 
which is narrowed down to the quickness of the procedure leading to the adoption of the 
final decision. The author observes that the procedure provides for more rapid resolution 
of cases, but it contains various drawback negatively affecting the quickness of the 
procedure. The fifth chapter is devoted to the enhanced effectiveness of commitments, 
mainly in comparison to remedies which may be imposed in a prohibition decision. The 
decisional practice of the Commission is examined in order to explore how commitment 
decisions were adopted in various circumstances. The sixth chapter analyses the impact 
of commitment decisions on the legal certainty of other market participants with the aim 
to strike the optimal balance between the effective use of these decisions and the principle 




Nařízení 1/2003 umožňuje Evropské Komisi vydávat rozhodnutí, kterým může učinit 
právně závaznými závazky nabídnuté od podniků vyšetřovaných pro protisoutěžní 
jednání. Přestože měla být rozhodnutí o závazcích alternativou ke standardním 
rozhodnutím zakazujícím protisoutěžní jednání, stala se dominantním typem rozhodnutí, 
které Komise využívá k řešení různých druhů potenciálních protisoutěžních jednání, 
mimo oblast tvrdých kartelů. Tato práce se zaměřuje zejména na efektivitu těchto 
rozhodnutí, zkoumá přitom různé aspekty, které jeho efektivitu zvyšují. První kapitola 
nastíní nejdůležitější změny v podobě vymáhání soutěžního práva EU, které přineslo 
Nařízení 1/2003. Druhá kapitola poskytuje nezbytný základ pro další analýzu tím, že 
představuje základní pravidla pro přijímání rozhodnutí o závazcích. Následující kapitola 
se věnuje vysvětlení důležitosti efektivity ve veřejnoprávním vymáhání soutěžního práva. 
Čtvrtá kapitola analyzuje efektivitu procedury přijímání rozhodnutí o závazcích, zejména 
s ohledem na rychlost přijetí tohoto rozhodnutí. Ačkoliv je zjištěno, že je řízení obecně 
rychlejší nežli v případě standardních rozhodnutí, jsou popsány nedostatky, které průběh 
řízení zpomalují. Pátá kapitola se zabývá efektivitou samotných závazků, a to zejména ve 
srovnání s nápravnými opatřeními, které může Komise uložit v rámci standardního 
rozhodnutí. Analýza rozhodovací praxe následně ukazuje, že Komise využila 
závazkových rozhodnutí v mnoha různých oblastech a za různých okolností. Šestá 
kapitola analyzuje dopad rozhodnutí o závazcích na právní jistotu ostatních hráčů na trhu 
s cílem najít optimální rovnováhu mezi efektivním užíváním závazkových rozhodnutí a 
principem právní jistoty. V závěru autor shrnuje poznatky z předchozích kapitol.  
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ANNEX NO. I – ORIGINS OF REGULATION 1/2003 
Origins of Regulation 1/2003 
The origin of Regulation 1/2003 dates back to the year 1997 when a group of 
Commission´s officials began to meet in the so-called Modernisation Group at the 
initiative of then Deputy Director-General of Commissions´ DG Competition Gianfranco 
Rocca.275 Three main findings were the starting points of groups´ efforts: the enlargement 
of the EU was swiftly approaching, the notification system was no longer effective for 
the enforcement of competition rules and that the developed EU competition rules 
allowed for the companies to assess the compliance of their agreements and practices with 
EU competition rules themselves.276 Modernisation group soon realised that a thorough 
change of the administrative procedure was required, a simple modification of the current 
procedure would not suffice.277 This led to publication of the White paper on 
modernisation of the rules implementing Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty in 1999.278 
The publication of the White paper came as a surprise even to the Commission´s officials, 
as the works of the Modernisation Group were kept secret. The publication was also 
surprising because the general view at the time was that the Commission would never 
propose to replace Regulation 17, as it would lead to Commission´s loss of its substantial 
powers which had been assigned to it by this regulation.279  
In the White paper, the Commission acknowledged that the system of centralised 
enforcement requiring a decision by the Commission on agreements or practices, which 
fulfil the conditions of Art. 101(3), is not consistent with the effective supervision of the 
competition any longer.280 As a consequence of the enforcement regime under Regulation 
                                                 
275 WILS, W., ‘Ten Years of Regulation 1/2003 – A Retrospective ‘, Journal of European Competition Law 
& Practice, 2013, Vol. 4, No. 4., p. 1. 
276 ROCCA, G., ‘Regulation 1/2003: a modernised application of EC competition rules’, Competition 
Policy Newsletter, 2003, No 1, Spring, p. 3. 
277 Ibid.  
278 European Commission, White paper on modernization of the rules implementing articles 85 and 86 of 
the EC treaty, Commission programme no 99/027, [1999]. 
279 EHLERMANN, C., 'The Modernization of EC Antitrust Policy: A Legal and Cultural Revolution' (2000) 
37 Common Market Law Review, Issue 3, p. 540. 
280 European Commission, White paper on modernization of the rules implementing articles 85 and 86 of 
the EC treaty, Commission programme no 99/027, [1999]. 
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No. 17, the Commission was swamped by over 34 500 notifications, with a constant 
backlog of more than 1000 notifications every year since 1994.281 Making the 
authorisation system work would require substantial resources for the Commission and 
also impose heavy costs on companies after the enlargement of the Community.282 As a 
result of these concerns, the White paper proposed abolition of the notification and 
exemption system and its replacement with a decentralised self-assessment regime of 
direct application of the Art. 101(3), without the requirement of a prior decision by the 
Commission.  
The reactions to the proposal were mostly positive,283 with an exemption of Germany, 
which was the biggest supporter of the notification system when Regulation 17 was being 
prepared in the late 1950s and early 1960s.284 Moreover, already in 1998, the 
Budeskartellamt proposed decentralising the notification and authorisation system 
between the Commission and the NCAs, without any knowledge of the Modernisation 
Groups works.285 This option was rejected for not being capable of decreasing the total 
number of notifications, the Commission had concluded that it would merely redistribute 
them.286 Other concerns were expressed by the European Parliament and the industry, 
which feared the decentralisation would lead to re-nationalisation of competition 
policy.287 These concerns led to the addition of Art. 3 into Commission´s legislative 
proposal in 2000288 which excluded the applicability of all national competition rules to 
any conduct captured by the Art. 101/102 TFEU, which affects trade between the Member 
States. However, a number of Member States were strongly opposing the wording of Art. 
3 of the proposal.289 This resulted in a compromise and the Commission modified Art. 3 
                                                 
281 Ibid., footnote 8. 
282 Ibid., p. 5. 
283 HAWK, B., ‘EU “modernisation”: a latter-day Reformation’, Global Competition Review 12, 
August/September 1999. 
284 WILS, W., ‘Ten Years of Regulation 1/2003 – A Retrospective ‘, Journal of European Competition Law 
& Practice, 2013, Vol. 4, No. 4., p. 1. 
285 WILS, W., ‘Ten Years of Regulation 1/2003 – A Retrospective ‘, Journal of European Competition Law 
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289 WILS, W., ‘Ten Years of Regulation 1/2003 – A Retrospective ‘, Journal of European Competition Law 
& Practice, 2013, Vol. 4, No. 4., p. 1. 
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into its final version, which stipulates a simultaneous application of national and EU law 
by the NCAs and national courts to agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings 
or concerted practices within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU, which may affect trade 
between the Member States and also to any abuse captured by Article 102.290 The purpose 
of this obligation is to ensure the cases are argued on the basis of EU law from the 
beginning and also that the mechanisms of newly set-up European Competition Network, 




                                                 
290 Regulation 1/2003, Article 3(1). 
291 Céline Gauer, Dorothe Dalheimer, Lars Kjolbye, Eddy De Smijter, Directorate-General Competition, 
unit A-2, Competition Policy Newsletter, 2003, No 1, Spring, p. 6. 
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ANNEX II. – TABLE OF COMMISSION´S DECISIONS  
N. Case 
ART. 







1 DFB  101 PA 22.10.2003 18.06.2004 14.09.2004 19.01.2005 15,1 
2 Coca-Cola 102  PA 29.09.2004 15.10.2004 26.11.2004 22.06.2005 8,9 
3 Alrosa 102 PA 05.03.2002 14.01.2003 03.06.2005 22.02.2006 48,3 
4 Premier league  101 SO 20.12.2002 20.12.2002 30.04.2004 22.03.2006 39,6 
5 Repsol 102 PA 20.12.2001 16.06.2004 20.10.2004 12.04.2006 52,5 
6 Cannes Extension agr. 101 PA 01.07.2003 23.01.2006 23.05.2006 04.10.2006 39,7 
7 Distrigaz 102 SO  24.02.2004 24.02.2004 01.03.2007 11.10.2007 44,2 
8 E.ON 102 PA 07.05.2008 27.05.2008 12.06.2008 26.11.2008 6,8 
9 RWE 102 PA 20.04.2007 15.10.2008 05.12.2008 18.03.2009 23,2 
10 Ships - IACS 101 PA 12.05.2009 12.05.2009 10.06.2009 14.10.2009 5,2 
11 GDF Gas 102 PA 16.05.2008 22.06.2009 09.07.2009 03.12.2009 18,9 
12 Rambus  102 SO 27.07.2007 27.07.2007 12.06.2009 09.12.2009 28,9 
13 Microsoft 102 SO 21.12.2007 14.01.2009 09.10.2009 16.12.2009 24,2 
14 EDF French electricity  102 SO 18.07.2007 19.12.2008 04.11.2009 17.03.2010 32,4 
15 Swedish interconnectors 102 PA 01.04.2009 25.06.2009 06.10.2009 14.04.2010 12,6 
16 E.ON gas 102 PA 22.10.2009 22.10.2009 22.01.2010 04.05.2010 6,5 
17 BA/AA/IB 101 SO 09.04.2009 29.09.2009 10.03.2010 14.07.2010 15,4 
18 ENI 102 SO 20.04.2007 06.03.2009 05.03.2010 29.09.2010 41,9 
19 Visa 101 SO 06.03.2008 03.04.2009 28.05.2010 08.12.2010 33,6 
20 Standard and Poor's 102 SO 06.01.2009 13.10.2009 14.05.2011 15.11.2011 34,8 
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21 IBM 102 PA 23.07.2010 01.09.2011 20.09.2011 13.12.2011 16,9 
22 Siemens  101 PA 21.05.2010 16.12.2011 14.03.2012 18.06.2012 25,3 
23 E-books  101 PA 01.12.2011 13.09.2012 19.09.2012 12.12.2012 12,6 
24 Rio Tinto Alcan 102 SO 20.02.2008 11.07.2012 10.09.2012 20.12.2012 58,8 
25 Reuters 102 PA 30.10.2009 19.09.2011 14.12.2011 20.12.2012 38,2 
26 CEZ 102 PA 11.07.2011 26.06.2012 10.07.2012 10.04.2013 21,3 
27 Continental/Lufthansa 101 PA 08.04.2009 10.10.2012 21.12.2012 23.05.2013 50,2 
28 E-books II 101 PA 01.12.2011 01.03.2013 19.04.2013 25.07.2013 20,1 
29 Deutsche bahn 102 PA 13.06.2012 06.06.2013 15.08.2013 18.12.2013 18,4 
30 Visa II 101 SO 06.03.2008 30.06.2012 14.06.2013 26.02.2014 72,8 
31 Samsung 102 SO 30.01.2012 21.12.2012 18.10.2013 29.04.2014 27,0 
32 Air France/KLM 101 PA 23.01.2012 26.09.2014 23.10.2014 12.05.2015 7,0 
33 BEH Electricity 102 SO 27.11.2012 12.08.2014 19.06.2015 10.12.2015 39,9 
34 Container Shipping  101 PA 21.11.2011 26.11.2015 16.02.2016 07.07.2016 56,3 
35 CDS - Information market 101 SO 20.04.2011 01.07.2013 29.04.2016 20.07.2016 63,9 
36 Paramount  101 SO 13.01.2014 23.07.2015 22.04.2016 26.07.2016 30,8 
 
